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Abstract
Traditional models of consumer choice assume consumers are aware of all products for sale.
This assumption is questionable, especially when applied to markets characterized by a high
degree of change, such as the personal computer (PC) industry. I present an empirical
discrete-choice model of limited information on the part of consumers, where advertising
inﬂuences the set of products from which consumers choose to purchase. Multi-product
ﬁrms choose prices and advertising in each medium to maximize their proﬁts. I apply the
model to the US PC market, in which advertising expenditures are over $2 billion annually.
The estimation technique incorporates macro and micro data from three sources. Esti-
mated median industry markups are 19% over production costs. The high industry markups
are explained in part by the fact that consumers know only some of the products for sale.
Indeed estimates from traditional consumer choice models predict median markups of one-
fourth this magnitude. I ﬁnd that product-speciﬁc demand curves are biased towards being
too elastic under traditional models of consumer choice. The estimates suggest that PC
ﬁrms use advertising media to target high-income households, that there are returns to scope
in group advertising, and that word-of-mouth or experience plays a role in informing con-
sumers. The top ﬁrms engage in higher than average advertising and earn higher than
average markups.
JEL Classiﬁc a t i o n :L 1 5 ,D 1 2 ,D 2 1 ,M 3 7 ,L 6 3
Keywords: Advertising, information, discrete choice models, product diﬀerentiation, per-
sonal computer industry
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1 Introduction
In 1998 over 36 million PCs were sold in the US, generating over $62 billion in sales — $2
billion of which was spent on advertising. The PC industry is one in which products change
rapidly, with a total of 200 new products introduced by the top 15 ﬁrms every year (Gartner
Inc., 1999). Due to the large number of PCs available and the frequency with which new
products are brought into the market, consumers are unlikely to be aware of all products
for sale. More generally, it is reasonable to suspect consumers have limited information
regarding the products available for purchase in many industries. Price elasticities calculated
under the assumption of full information may be misleading, which could lead to incorrect
conclusions regarding the nature of competition. The goal of this study is to examine
the eﬀects of limited choice set information on price and advertising demand elasticities and
markups, which have implications for the sources of market power and the role of advertising
in the US PC industry.
I develop and estimate a model in which consumers are not assumed to know all products
that are available when they make their purchase decision. Advertising inﬂuences the set of
products from which consumers choose to purchase, where the probability a consumer knows
a product is a function of advertising and consumer attributes. Allowing for heterogeneity in
consumer’s choice sets yields more realistic estimates of substitution patterns between goods.
The results suggest that (i) ﬁrms beneﬁt from limited information on part of consumers and
(ii) that assuming full information may result in incorrect conclusions regarding the nature
of competition. For example, estimated median markups over marginal costs in the PC
1i n d u s t r ya r e1 9 % . T h eh i g hm a r k u p sa r ee x p l a i n e di np a r tb yt h ef a c tt h a tc o n s u m e r s
know only some of the products for sale, which results in a less competitive environment.
Assuming consumers are aware of all products generates inconsistent estimates of product-
speciﬁc demand curves that are biased towards being too elastic. Indeed estimates from
traditional consumer choice models predict median markups of one quarter of the magnitude
predicted by a model of limited information.
Estimation of the structural model is complicated by the lack of individual-level pur-
chase and advertising exposure data for the PC industry. I use three primary data sets
in estimation. One is from Gartner Inc.’s Dataquest and includes product-level market
shares and other product characteristics. The second is from Leading National Advertisers
(LNA) and includes national advertising expenditures across media. The ﬁnal data set is
from Simmons Market Research and includes consumer-level purchases across manufactur-
ers, consumer characteristics, and media exposure information. I exploit the information
in these data to estimate a model which allows for three important sources of consumer
heterogeneity: choice sets, tastes, and advertising media exposure.
Petrin (2002) shows how combining aggregate data with data that links average consumer
attributes to product attributes allows one to obtain more precise estimates. The approach
I take is similar in that I augment market share data with data relating consumers to the
characteristics of the products they purchase. It diﬀers in that the individual level data
I have connect consumers to ﬁrms from which they purchased, thus associating consumer
attributes and average product attributes (across ﬁrms). I combine the manufacturer-choice
data with aggregate product-level data to obtain more precise estimates of the parameters
of the taste distribution.
Additionally, I show how to combine aggregate advertising data with information relat-
ing consumer attributes to media exposure. This new technique allows one to obtain a
more precise picture of how advertising media exposure and demand are related (relative to
using only aggregate data). Together, both parts of the data augmentation methodology
2enable one to control for heterogeneity in tastes and advertising exposure across households
— thereby permitting a model which allows for individual heterogeneity in choice sets while
having limited information connecting consumers to purchases and advertising.
There are a number of recent structural studies of advertising utilizing individual-level
purchase and advertising exposure data. Erdem and Keane (1996) (hereafter EK) esti-
mate models where consumers learn (in a Bayesian manner) about the quality of laundry
detergents through past experience and advertising exposures. Experience and advertise-
ments relay noisy information about product quality which consumers use to update their
expectations. Ackerberg (2003) estimates a model in the spirit of Milgrom and Roberts
(1986) by allowing advertising for Yoplait yogurt to have indirectly informative (signaling)
and uninformative (prestige) eﬀects. He posits that advertising will aﬀect consumers who
have had prior experience with Yoplait diﬀerently than those who have not tried the prod-
uct. Consumers who know the product (experienced consumers) should not be aﬀected
by exposures to informative advertising. Alternatively, the prestige eﬀects of advertising
should aﬀect both inexperienced and experienced consumers. He ﬁnds a large and signiﬁ-
cant signaling eﬀect of advertising and an insigniﬁcant prestige eﬀect. Anand and Shachar
(2001) examine the market for network television programs and the eﬀects of preview adver-
tising on channel viewing decisions. They extend the model of EK to incorporate additional
sources of information (such as word-of-mouth), which are modeled as noisy signals as well.
They also allow advertising to have a persuasive eﬀect, by aﬀecting utility directly.1 They
ﬁnd that exposure to advertising is informative and results in an improved match of con-
sumers to products. Shum (forthcoming) also examines how the eﬀect of advertising diﬀers
across households. In his model, brand loyal behavior is the cause of diﬀerent responses
by consumers to advertising. He employs a micro-level panel dataset on weekly household
1 Becker and Murphy (1993) present a model in which ﬁrms use advertising to suggest consumption of
their product is prestigious. Rational consumers prefer to consume more heavily advertised goods. When a
consumer buys a product, she is also buying an image. In these models, uninformative advertising directly
eﬀects utility.
3purchases of breakfast cereals and matches this to aggregated advertising data.
Grossman and Shapiro (1984) (hereafter GS) present a theoretical model of informative
advertising. Theirs is a circular model of spatially diﬀerentiated products in which adver-
tising messages provide consumers with information about product availability and price.2
The research presented here is loosely related to GS in that (i) consumers are heterogenous
and seek to purchase the product that gives them the highest utility and (ii) advertising con-
veys information about the existence and attributes of diﬀerentiated products. However, the
empirical model diﬀers greatly from GS along several dimensions. Most importantly, I wish
to allow for a more ﬂexible model of product diﬀerentiation and hence abandon the circular
city framework. The empirical model in this work is a discrete choice model of product
diﬀerentiation (see Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse 1989, 1992). In addition, unlike GS,
advertising is not the only source of information for consumers. In this study, consumers
may be informed if there is no advertising wh e r et h ed e g r e et ow h i c ht h e ya r ei n f o r m e d
depends on their characteristics. Finally, I do not observe individual speciﬁc advertising
messages, which is central to the GS framework. For these reasons, in addition to the
necessity of having an empirically tractable model, the “information technology” (and the
resulting market shares) presented in this work diﬀer greatly in form from those in GS.
I have an additional challenge in modeling choice set heterogeneity across consumers; I
do not observe which of the possible 2J choice sets the consumer faces (where J are the
number of products). Chiang, Chib, and Narasimhan (1999) use individual-level purchase
and advertising data to estimate a model that allows for “consideration set” heterogeneity
across consumers. A consideration set is a (potential) subset of the possible 2J choice sets.
The consideration set they take to the data is obtained by making assumptions regarding a
consumer’s decision making process. For example, a consumer’s consideration set may be
the set of all previously purchased brands. Due to the stable nature of their industry of
2 Grossman and Shapiro (1984) extended the model of Butters (1977), who considers a market of ho-
mogenous goods.
4interest (the ketchup industry), the authors provide evidence that a consumer’s consideration
set doesn’t change over time. Under this assumption, they are able to eliminate choice sets
which do not contain all previously purchased brands.3 In addition, the scanner data they
use contains information on four main brands in the industry, which eases computational
burden signiﬁcantly since there are not a large number of products to contend with.
The PC industry is much diﬀerent than the ketchup industry, it is rapidly changing and
there are over 200 products introduced by the top ﬁrms alone each year. Therefore, I use a
diﬀerent approach than Chiang, et. al. to model consumer choice set heterogeneity. Due to
the large number of products in the PC industry, it is not feasible to calculate all possible
purchase probabilities for each product corresponding to each possible choice set. Instead I
simulate a choice set for each individual in each period and construct an importance sampler
to smooth the simulated choice probabilities. The simulator for the market share is the
average over individuals of these smoothed choice probabilities. In addition, the distribution
of consumer tastes is an empirical one, which also makes simulation of the market shares
necessary. The simulator is discussed in more detail in section 4.4 and appendix B.4
Estimation is in two parts. First, I use consumer-level data on media exposure (from
Simmons) to estimate media-speciﬁc parameters that measure how exposure varies with
consumer attributes. Given the nature of the data, these parameters are estimated by
ordered response maximum likelihood. In the second stage, I simultaneously estimate the
remainder of the parameters using generalized method of moments. There are four “sets”
of moments. The ﬁrst utilizes aggregate product-level data (from Gartner) to ﬁt observed
market shares to those implied by the model. The second arises from the ﬁrm’s proﬁt
maximizing choices of prices. These two sets of moments are similar to those in Berry,
3 Consideration set formation is modeled by taking the power set of the available products and assigning
a probability mass on each subset. This probability mass has a Dirichlet distribution across the consumers
with known parameters. A subset that doesn’t contain one of the previously purchased products receives a
weight of zero.
4 I utilize antithetic acceleration to reduce the variance due to simulation.
5Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) (hereafter BLP). The third set of moments arises from the
ﬁrm’s optimal choices of advertising medium (using data from LNA). These require care in
constructing because some ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal not to advertise in some media. The fourth
set of moments exploits the micro-level data on manufacturer choice (from Simmons).
As is common in this literature, one must address the issue of endogeneity of prices and,
in this setting, advertising levels. While previous studies use product speciﬁc dummies to
correct for the endogeneity of advertising, I form exogenous instruments that are approxima-
tions to the optimal instruments to correct for the correlation between unobserved quality
and advertising or price.
To summarize, my research diﬀers from previous studies in a few fundamental ways.
First, I explicitly model the eﬀect of advertising when consumers have limited information
about the choice set available to them. Previous studies have modeled advertising as part of
the consumer’s utility function or as a noisy signal of product attributes, where consumers
are assumed to know all products for sale. Secondly, prior studies utilize individual-level
data on both consumption and advertising exposures. I don’t have access to such detailed
data for the PC industry, yet I am still able to determine the inﬂuence of advertising on an
individual’s choice set, where this inﬂuence diﬀers across consumers. Thirdly, I allow the
eﬀect of advertising to diﬀer across media. Due to data limitations, previous studies only
considered television advertising. Finally, I model ﬁrms’ decisions with regard to pricing
and advertising choices across media, which allows me to examine the additional markup
ﬁrms earn as a result of limited consumer information. I compare these markups to those
predicted by traditional consumer choice models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I discuss the data.
I develop the model in section 3 and present the estimation technique in section 4. The
results from preliminary regressions and from the full model are discussed in sections 5 and
6 respectively. I present speciﬁcation tests and conclusions in the ﬁnal sections 7 and 8.
62D a t a
2.1 Product Level Data
The product-level data were provided by Gartner Inc.’s Dataquest and consist of quarterly
shipments and dollar sales of all PCs sold between 1996 and 1998.5 The majority of ﬁrms sell
to the home market as well as to businesses, educational institutions, and the government.
The Dataquest data detail sales across sectors and, since the focus of this research is on
consumer purchasing behavior, I use the home market data to estimate the model.6 Sales
in the home market comprise over 30% of all PCs sold.
The PC industry is concentrated, with the top ﬁve ﬁrms accounting for over 63% (61%)
of the dollar (unit) home market share on average. In addition, over 80% of PC sales to the
home market sector are from the top 10 manufacturers. Table 1 shows home market shares
of the leading manufacturers. The major market players did not change over the period of
the data. I restrict my attention to the top 10 ﬁr m s( b a s e do nh o m em a r k e ts h a r e )a n dt o5
others.7 These 15 “included” ﬁrms account for over 85% (83%) of the dollar (unit) home
market share on average.
There is substantial product diﬀerentiation in the industry. PCs are diﬀerentiated along
many dimensions such as processor type and speed, hard drive space, form factor (desktop,
laptop, etc.), RAM, etc. Data limitations prevent me from including all product char-
acteristics. Gartner collects information on ﬁve main attributes of each of the PCs: the
manufacturer (e.g. Dell), the brand (e.g. Latitude LX), the form factor (e.g. desktop), the
CPU type (e.g. Pentium II), and the CPU speed. I deﬁn eam o d e la sam a n u f a c t u r e r ,
brand, CPU type, CPU speed, form factor combination. Even though I do not have data
5 I constructed a price variable by dividing dollar sales by the number of units sold, which was deﬂated
using the Consumer Price Index from BLS.
6 Since ﬁrms’ proﬁts depend on sales to all sectors, I use the non-home sector data when developing the
supply side of the problem in section 3.3.
7 This enables me to make full use of consumer-level manufacturer purchase data (from Simmons), which
is discussed shortly. The included manufacturers are Acer, Apple, AST, AT&T, Compaq, Dell, DEC, Epson,
Gateway, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Micron, NEC, Packard-Bell, and Texas Instruments.
7on some product attributes, the richness of the Dataquest data still allows for a very narrow
model deﬁnition. For example, Compaq Armada 3xxx Pentium 150/166 laptop and Com-
paq Armada 4xxx Pentium 150/166 laptop are two separate models, as are an Apple Power
Macintosh Power PC 604 180/200 desktop and deskside.
Treating a model/quarter as an observation, the total sample size is 2112.8 These 2112
observations represent 723 distinct models sold in the home market. The majority of the
PCs oﬀered to home consumers were desk PCs, about 71%, and over 83% of the processors
were Pentium-based (either Pentium, Pentium II, or Pentium Pro). The number of models
oﬀered by each ﬁrm varied. Compaq had the largest selection with 138 diﬀerent choices,
while Texas Instruments oﬀered only ﬁve. On average, each ﬁrm in my sample oﬀered a
particular model for 3 quarters. The “modal” PC oﬀered by each ﬁrm was a desktop with
a Pentium processor having an average speed of 220 MHz.
The potential market size is given by the number of US households in a given period, as
reported by the Census Bureau. Market shares are computed as unit sales of each model
divided by the market size. The market share of the outside good is one minus the share of
t h ei n s i d eg o o d s .
2.2 Advertising Data
The product level sales data are combined with advertising data as reported in Compet-
itive Media Reporting’s LNA/ Multi-Media publication. These data consist of quarterly
advertising expenditures across 10 media. From the 10 media, I construct four main media
categories: newspaper, magazine, television (TV) and radio.9
Unlike the product-level data, the advertising data are not broken down by sector (e.g.
8 This is the sample size after eliminating observations with negligible quarterly market shares.
9 The “magazine” medium also includes Sunday magazines. The “television” medium encompasses all
programs shown on network, spot, cable or syndicated TV. The “radio” medium encompasses network and
spot radio advertising. In addition, I include outdoor advertising in the radio medium. Outdoor advertising
represents a very small fraction of expenditures (on average less than 0.3%). There are too many zero
observations for outdoor advertising to use it separately, and so I choose to add it to the radio medium.
8home, business, etc). Competitive Media Reporting (CMR) reports total advertising expen-
ditures on all computers and computer systems. The CMR measure includes advertising
for non-PCs intended for the business, government or education markets (such as mainframe
servers and unix workstations).10 Fortunately, CMR categorizes advertising across prod-
ucts, which in some instances, allows me to isolate certain expenditures as for non-home
computers. For example, expenditures are sometimes generally reported (e.g. IBM various
computers) and other times are more detailed (e.g. IBM RS/6000 Server). Since some
expenditures are generally reported, it is not possible to construct a measure that consists
solely of advertising for the home PC market. As a result the advertising measure used in
this research includes some expenditures on non-PC systems used in the business, education,
or governmental sectors.
Total advertising expenditures in the computer industry have grown from $1.4 billion in
1995 to over $2.3 billion in 1999 (an average annual rate of close to 13%). Table 2 provides a
summary for the leading manufacturers. There is much variation in advertising expenditures
across ﬁrms. Notably, ﬁfty percent of the industry expenditures are by IBM, resulting in
an (total) ad-to-sales ratio of over 19 percent (compared to the industry ratio of 3%).
IBM is the largest computer manufacturer in the world. The large advertising expen-
ditures by IBM, relative to other ﬁrms in the industry, may be due to their position in the
non-PC category of the computer industry. To examine whether IBM’s sizable advertising
expenditures are a result of its non-PC interests (servers, mainframes, unix workstations,
etc.), I allow the position of the ﬁrm in the non-PC sector to aﬀect the marginal revenue of
advertising from the non-home sectors.
In the PC industry, it is common for ﬁrms to advertise products simultaneously in groups.
For example, in 1996 one of Compaq’s advertising campaigns involved all Presario brand PCs
(of which there are 12). I have to make some assumptions about the informativeness of group
10 However, advertising expenditures on computer components and accessories (such as printers) are
itemized separately.
9advertising. One possibility is that it provides as much information about the products in
the group as product-speciﬁc advertising. However, if group advertising were as eﬀective
as product advertising, we would observe only group advertising (because this would be
the most eﬃcient use of resources). An alternative possibility is that group advertising is
not informative about the products in the group; it merely informs the consumer about the
manufacturer. If this were the case, we should observe either ﬁrm-level (the largest possible
group) or product-speciﬁc advertising.
In reality, ﬁrms use a combination of product-speciﬁc and group advertising (with groups
of varying sizes). I need a measure of advertising expenditures by product that incorporates
all advertising done for the product. I construct “eﬀective” product advertising expendi-
tures by adding observed product-speciﬁce x p e n d i t u r e st oaw e i g h t e da v e r a g eo fa l lg r o u p
expenditures for that product, where the weights are estimated. To be more precise, let
Gj be the set of all possible product groups that include product j (I suppress the time
subscript). Let adH be (observed) total advertising expenditures for group H ∈ Gj,w h e r e











where the sum is over the diﬀerent groups that include product j.12 If there is only one
product in the group (i.e. it is product-speciﬁc), I restrict γ to unity and π to zero. Notice
that this speciﬁcation allows for increasing or decreasing returns to group advertising, where
γ and π are parameters to be estimated.
11 I call these “eﬀective” product advertising expenditures to indicate they are constructed from observed
group and product-speciﬁc advertising.
12 To get an idea of the level of detail in the data: in the ﬁrst quarter of 1998, there were 18 group adver-
tisements for Apple computers. The groups advertised ranged from “various computers” to “PowerBook” to
“Macintosh Power PC G3 Portable” (the later being a speciﬁc model). In this quarter the Apple Macintosh
Power PC G3 Portable computer belonged to 7 diﬀerent product groups.
102.3 Consumer Level Data
The consumer level data come from the Survey of Media and Markets conducted by Simmons
Market Research Bureau. Simmons collects data on consumers’ media habits, product usage,
and demographic characteristics from about 20,000 households annually. I use two years of
the survey from 1996-1997 (data from 1998 were not publicly available).13 Households in
the Simmons data contain at least one respondent 18 years or older. Descriptive statistics
for the overall population and the sample used in estimation are given in Table 3.14
Ideally, one would have data on an individual’s product purchase, demographics, and
exposure to product advertising. Unfortunately, micro-level purchase and advertising ex-
p o s u r ed a t aa r en o ta v a i l a b l ef o rt h eP Ci n d u s t r y . W h i l et h eS i m m o n sd a t aa r en o ti d e a l ,
they do contain information that allows me to link demographics with purchases and to con-
trol for heterogeneity across households in advertising media exposure. I use these data in
combination with the macro market share (from Gartner) and advertising data (from LNA)
to obtain more precise parameter estimates.
Simmons collects information on PC ownership, including whether the individual pur-
chased a PC in the past year and the PC manufacturer. Approximately 11% of the house-
holds purchased a PC in the last 12 months. However, the Simmons data are not detailed to
the product level. Respondents were not asked any speciﬁcs regarding their PC other than
the manufacturer. In addition, only 15 manufacturers were listed separately. I use the Sim-
mons data to construct moments relating individual purchases and demographic attributes
to product attributes. The micro-moments are valuable when used in conjunction with
the macro-level product data. The strategy of using both micro-data and macro-data in
estimation follows recent work by BLP (2004) and Petrin (2002). I discuss the construction
of the micro-moments in more detail in section 4.2.
13 To reduce the sample to a manageable size, I select respondents randomly from each year. The ﬁnal
sample size is 13,400.
14 The Simmons survey oversamples in large metropolitan areas, however this oversampling causes no
estimation bias because residential location is treated as exogenous.
11Relying on aggregate advertising data has the drawback that there is no observed vari-
ation in advertising across households. In addition to purchase information, the Simmons
respondents were asked about their media habits. They were ranked according to how
often they viewed TV programs, read newspapers, etc. relative to others in the surveyed
population. I use the self-reported media exposure information to control for heterogeneity
in advertising media exposure across households. The Simmons demographic and media
exposure data are combined with (separate) information on market shares and product char-
acteristics, which provides a more precise picture of how media exposure and demand are
related. Table 4 details media exposure across households. I have information on the ranges
of answers given by the respondents, but the survey reports only the quintile to which the
consumer belongs. I discuss the speciﬁc way in which the media-exposure data are used in
section 4.1.
I also construct BLP-type macro-moments. I use the Consumer Population Survey (CPS)
data to deﬁne the distribution of consumer characteristics for use in the macro-moments.
I use the CPS data because the Simmons data are available only for the ﬁrst two years of
the three for which I have product and advertising level data whereas the CPS is available
over all the years of interest. I use the CPS data in constructing the macro-moments15 and
the Simmons data in constructing the micro-moments, which are discussed in more detail in
section 4.2.
3E c o n o m i c M o d e l
The primitives of the model are product attributes, consumer preferences, and the notion of
equilibrium. I assume the econometrican observes price, advertising choices across media,
and quantities sold by each ﬁrm. The structural estimation strategy requires me to specify
15 I drew a sample of 3,000 individuals from the March CPS for each year. Quarterly income data were
constructed from annual data and were deﬂated using the Consumer Price Index from BLS. A few households
reported an annual income below $5000. These households were dropped from the sample. Examination of
the Simmons data indicate that purchases were made only by households with annual income greater than
$5000, therefore eliminating very low income households should not aﬀect the group of interest.
12a model of consumer choice, derive the implied relationships among choice probabilities,
specify ﬁrm behavior, and estimate the parameters of the model.16 The econometric
technique I employ follows those found in recent studies of diﬀerentiated products, such as
B e r r y ,L e v i n s o h n ,a n dP a k e s( 1 9 9 5 ,1 9 9 8), Nevo (2000), and Petrin (2002).
3.1 Utility and Demand
Individual i =1 ,...,I chooses from j =1 ,...,J products at time t =1 ,...,T. A product
pertains to a speciﬁcP Cm o d e ld e ﬁned as a manufacturer-brand- CPU type-CPU speed-
form factor combination. The characteristics of product j are represented by (xj,p jt,ξjt).
Observable attributes are represented by pjt, the price, and the vector xj which consists of
CPU speed (MHz), a laptop dummy variable, a Pentium dummy variable, ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects,
and a constant.17 Attributes that are unobserved by the econometrician but known to the
consumer are represented by ξjt. The income of individual i at time t is given by yit.T h e
indirect utility consumer i obtains from product j at time t is given by
uijt = αln(yit − pjt)+x
0
jβit + ξjt + ²ijt (2)
where βit are individual speciﬁc components, and ²ijt is a mean zero stochastic term, which
represents idiosyncratic individual preferences and is assumed to be independently and iden-
tically distributed across products and consumers.18
16 The model presented in this paper is static. The primary reason for choosing a static model is lack of
adequate data. To properly examine dynamics, consumer-level purchasing and advertising exposure data
are necessary. Modeling choices as static has certain implications. For one, it does not capture the long-
term eﬀects associated with advertising, such as brand building. While branding is an important issue, the
majority of PC ﬁrms have not changed over the period and most had been in existence for a number of
years prior to the start of the data. This suggests these ﬁrms would not have as much need to establish
a brand-image as to spread information about new products. There are advantages to a static framework.
I am able to focus on the inﬂuence of advertising on the choice set absent the additional structure and
complications of a dynamic setting. Also, the nature of advertising in the PC industry lends itself to a
static framework. Products change rapidly. Advertising today informs about products today, and its
eﬀects on future information provision are minimal, if not zero. That is, advertising from last year is not
informative this year since the same products are no longer for sale.
17 Id on o ti n c l u d eb r a n dﬁxed eﬀects as there are over 200 brands.
18 Note that the indirect utility in equation (2) can be derived from a Cobb-Douglas utility function (see
BLP). I have chosen this speciﬁcation for indirect utility to allow for wealth eﬀects. See also Petrin (2002)
13To allow for correlation between product choices and consumer characteristics, I employ
ar a n d o mc o e ﬃcient model. Let
βit = β + ΠDit + Σνi, νi ∼ N(0,I k) (3)
where β are the mean preferences for observable attributes of the good excluding price, Dit are
observed consumer attributes, Π are coeﬃcients measuring how tastes vary with attributes,
and Σ is a scaling matrix. A consumer’s taste for a product characteristic may depend on
characteristics not observed by the econometrician, as captured by νi. I assume that the νi
are independently normally distributed across the population with mean zero and variance
to be estimated. The distribution of consumer characteristics is an empirical one given by
the CPS (see section 2.3).19
Equations (2) and (3) can be rewritten as
uijt = δjt + µijt + ²ijt, (4)
where δjt = x0
jβ +ξjt captures the base level of utility every consumer derives from product
j and the composite random shock, µijt+²ijt,20 captures heterogeneity in consumers’ tastes
for product attributes where
µijt = αln(yit − pjt)+xj
0(ΠDit + νi).
One can use market-level data to estimate the parameters of the taste distribution. However,
I have additional information linking consumers to the products they purchase, which I use
to augment the market level data to obtain more precise estimates of the parameters of the
taste distribution.
who uses a more general functional form which includes wealth eﬀects.
19 The demographic variables include measures of age, household size, income, sex, and race.
20 Since choices of an individual are invariant to multiplication of utility by a person-speciﬁc constant, I
have ﬁxed the standard deviation of the ²ijt. In theory, I could estimate an unrestricted variance-covariance
matrix, however in practice this is not feasible given there are over 2000 products (it implies estimating
J(J − 1)/2 parameters).
14The consumers may decide not to purchase any of the goods; instead they may decide
to purchase the “outside” good. The outside good might include nonpurchase, purchase of
a used PC, or purchase of a new PC from a ﬁrm not included in the “15 included ﬁrms.”
The presence of an outside good allows for lower market sales in response to a market wide
uniform price increase. The indirect utility from the outside option is
ui0t = αln(yit)+ξ0t + ²i0t,
where the price of the outside good is normalized to zero. Since I cannot identify relative
levels of utility, the mean utility of one good is not identiﬁed. Thus, I normalize ξ0t to zero.
I assume a consumer purchases at most one good per period.21 The consumer chooses
the good which provides the highest utility, U, from all the goods in his choice set. First I
consider the case in which the consumer has full-information regarding the products for sale.
Consumer i will purchase good j at time t if and only if
Ujt ≥ Urt,∀r 6= j.
Deﬁne the set of variables that results in the purchase of good j : Rjt ≡ {(yit,D it,νi,² ijt):
Uijt ≥ Uirt ∀r 6= j}. Assuming ties occur with zero probability, the probability that








where F(·) denotes the respective known distribution functions. To derive the market share
of product j, I integrate over the observed joint distribution of (yit,D it) and the assumed
distribution of (νi,² ijt) in the population, where the second equation follows from indepen-
dence assumptions. In order to obtain simple expressions for choice probabilities, I assume
the ² are distributed i.i.d. type I extreme value. Therefore the probability that product j is
chosen conditional on (y,D,ν) is given by the multinomial logit (MNL) choice probability.
21 This assumption may be unwarranted for some products for which multiple purchase is common. How-
ever it is not unreasonable to restrict a consumer to purchase one computer per quarter. Hendel (1999)
examines purchases of PCs by businesses and presents a multiple-choice model of PC purchases.
153.2 Information Technology
In my model, the probability that consumer i purchases product j will depend upon the
probability she is aware of product j, which products are competing with j (that is which
products are in her choice set) and, given her choice set, the probability she would buy
product j. The ﬁrm’s advertisement alerts the consumer to the product’s existence and
thereby increases the probability that the product is in the consumer’s choice set.22
Let Cj be the set of all possible choice sets that include product j. Assuming consumers
are aware of the outside option with probability one, and that the ² are distributed i.i.d.















r∈S exp{δrt + µirt}
(6)
where φijt is the probability consumer i is informed about product j, the outside sum is over
the diﬀerent choice sets that include product j,a n dt h eyit
α in the denominator is from the
presence of an outside good. Advertising aﬀects demand through the information technology
function, φijt, which describes the eﬀectiveness of advertising at informing consumers.
The information technology is modeled as a function of product j’s advertising by
medium, observed consumer characteristics, and unobserved idiosyncratic consumer-advertising-
medium-speciﬁce ﬀects. The information technology function for consumer i is given by
φijt(θφ,Υ)=
exp(τijt)
1+e x p( τijt)
(7)




jt(ϕ + ρajt + Ψf + ΥD
s
it + κi)l n κi ∼ N(0,I m)
22 This is not a model of advertising content, but of product existence. That is, once a consumer is aware
of the existence of a product she is also aware of the product’s attributes. As noted in the introduction GS
present a theoretical model of informative advertising in a circular city framwork, however the market share
speciﬁcation I develop in this section diﬀers greatly from that in GS.
16where θφ = {λ,γ,π,ϕ,ρ,Ψ}.23 The number of advertisements for product j is broken
down across four media and represented by the m(= 4) dimensional vector, ajt. The four
media are magazines, newspapers, television, and radio.24 The e d dimensional parameter
vector λ measures the fraction of consumers of type e Dit who are informed without seeing any
advertising (e D is a subset of all consumer characteristics, D);25 ϕ measures advertising’s
eﬀectiveness; ρ captures the decreasing or increasing eﬀectiveness of advertising; and Ψ are
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. These capture how variation in advertising eﬀectiveness varies across
ﬁrms.26
Ideally, one would have data on an individual’s exposure to product j’s advertising (mea-
sured as number of messages). Unfortunately, micro-level advertising exposure data are
not available for the PC industry. However, I control for heterogeneity in advertising expo-
sure across households (as it is related to observables) by taking advantage of self-reported
media exposure information (including the amount of time spent watching TV, reading mag-
azines, etc.) from the Simmons survey. The matrix Υm×d captures how advertising media’s
eﬀectiveness varies by observed consumer characteristics from the Simmon’s survey, Ds.27
In addition I include a stochastic consumer-medium-speciﬁc term (κim)i nt h ei n f o r m a t i o n
technology speciﬁcation. The κim are unobserved consumer heterogeneity with regard to
advertising medium eﬀectiveness, these include consumer attributes that may inﬂuence the
eﬀectiveness of medium m at informing the consumer, but that aren’t picked up by observed
23 The reason for separating Υ from the other parameters in the information technology function will
become clear when I discuss estimation.
24 The number of advertisements are advertising expenditures, adjm, divided by the weighted average price
of an advertisement in medium m. Recall, from section 2.2 that adj is a weighted sum of model speciﬁc
and group advertising where the weights, γ,π, a r et ob ee s t i m a t e d .
25 The subset of consumers characteristics ( e D) consist of a constant, and dummy variables for high school
graduate, whether income is below $60,000, and whether income is above $100,000 (that is, e d =4 ) . I include
ﬁxed eﬀects only for those ﬁrms that oﬀered a product every quarter.
26 The advertising technology depends upon own product advertising only. Implicit in this speciﬁcation is
the assumption that product speciﬁc or group advertising for product r 6= j provides no information about
product j.
27 See Table 9 for a list of attributes included in Ds.
17demographic characteristics.
As advertising increases, the information technology approaches one but it is non-zero
even for zero advertisements. The latter property comes from the presumption that a fraction
of consumers are informed even if there is no advertising, that is φ(a =0 )> 0, which allows
for positive demand when no advertising occurs. The magnitude of the probability that a
consumer is informed when no advertising occurs is determined by e D0
itλ.28
Since I assumed the unobservables have known, independent distributions, I integrate
over them and the joint distribution of income and consumer attributes in the population.




where sijt i sg i v e ni ne q u a t i o n( 6 ) . M a r k e ts h a r ei saf unction of prices and advertising of all
products. When all ﬁrms advertise more and the information probability for all products
approaches one, market share approaches the standard full information choice probability.
Naturally, the smaller is the information technology the smaller is product market share.
Demand for product j at time t is Mtsjt, where Mt i st h em a r k e ts i z eg i v e nb yt h en u m b e r
of households in the US.
3.3 Firm Behavior
I assume there are F ﬁrms in an oligopolistically competitive industry and that they are non-
cooperative, Bertrand-Nash competitors. Each ﬁrm produces a subset of the J products,


















28 There are a number of reasons why individuals may be informed, even in the event that they haven’t
seen an advertisement. They may have received information by word-of-mouth, experience with the product,
or exposure to other non-advertising media coverage (i.e. read a magazine article). See Anand and Shachar
(2001).
18where sj i st h ev e c t o ro fh o m em a r k e ts h a r e sf o rp r o d u c tj given in (8), which is a function
of the prices and advertising levels of all products; mcj is the marginal cost of production;
Πnh
j is the gross proﬁt (before advertising) from sales to the non-home sectors; mcad
jm is the
marginal cost of advertising in medium m; ajm is the number of medium m advertisements;
and Cf are ﬁxed costs of production.
Following the approach taken in BLP, I assume marginal costs are log-linear and com-
posed of unobserved and observed cost characteristics, ωj and wj respectively. I expect
unobserved cost characteristics to be correlated with ξj, that is PCs with high unobserved
quality might be more expensive to produce. I account for the correlation between ω and ξ
in estimation. The (log) marginal cost function is given by
ln(mcj)=w
0
jη + ωj (10)
where η is a vector of parameters.
Similarly, I assume marginal costs of advertising are composed of observed components,
wad
jm (such as the average price of an advertisement),29 and unobserved product-speciﬁc





jmψ + υj υj ∼ N(0,I m) (11)
where ψ is to be estimated.
Given their products and the advertising, prices, and attributes of competing products,
ﬁrms choose prices and advertising media levels simultaneously to maximize proﬁts. Product
attributes that aﬀect demand (xj,ξj) and those that aﬀect marginal costs (wj,ωj,w ad
jm,υj),
which will be discussed shortly, are treated as exogenous to the ﬁrm’s pricing and advertising
decisions. Since PC ﬁrms may sell to non-home sectors (such as the business, education,
29 The LNA data consist of advertising expenditures across 10 media, from which I construct 4 main media
groups. I observe the distribution of ﬁrm spending across the original 10 media. The quarterly average
ad price in media group m is a weighted average of the ad prices in the original categories comprising the
media group. The weights are ﬁrm speciﬁc and are determined by the distribution of the ﬁrms advertising
across the original media.
19and government sectors), some discussion is necessary regarding optimal choices of prices
and advertising levels. Constant marginal costs imply pricing decisions are independent
across sectors.30 Therefore, any product sold in the home market sector will have prices








However, an advertisement intended to reach a home consumer may aﬀect sales in other
sectors. Optimal advertising choices must equate the marginal revenue of an additional
advertisement in all sectors with the marginal cost. Optimal advertising medium choices














nh) is the marginal revenue of advertising in non-home market sectors. I
assume mrnh is a linear combination of price in the non-home sector, pnh
j , and the vector
xnh









x .32 For ease of exposition, let ηAD =
{vec(ψ),vec(θnh)} be the vector of parameters associated with advertising medium choices.
30 There are reasons to believe that pricing decisions may not be independent across sectors. For instance,
if the price of a particular laptop is lower in the business sector, a consumer might buy the laptop from their
business account for use at home. I abstract away from this problem for two reasons. First, identiﬁcation of
a model which includes pricing decisions across all sectors would require much richer data than I have on the
non-home sectors. Second, education, government, and business purchases usually involve more than one
computer. Hence, one should allow for multiple purchases per period in the non-home sector, which greatly
complicates the model (see Hendel, 1999). While the assumptions on ﬁrm behavior that I impose imply
independent pricing decisions, the parameter estimates that I obtain are sensible. In addition, goodness-of-
ﬁt tests suggest the model ﬁts the data reasonably well. Hence, the results suggest that the model does not
do a poor job of describing the PC industry even when pricing decisions are independent across sectors.
31 Non-PC sales are constructed by subtracting quarterly PC sales from quarterly total manufacturer sales
(as recorded in ﬁrm quarterly reports). Therefore “non-home sales” include sales of computer systems such
as mainframes, servers, and unix workstations.
32 Ideally, one would construct mrnh in a structural framework analogous to that used to construct the
marginal revenue of advertising in the home market sector. However, identiﬁcation of the parameters would
require much richer data than I have. In addition, one should allow multiple purchases per period in the
non-home sector, which greatly complicates the model (see Hendel, 1999).
204 The Estimation Technique
The parameters of the model associated with the demand-side are Υ,β, and θ = {α,Σ,Π,θφ}
and the supply-side parameters are η and ηAD. Under the assumption that the observed
data are the equilibrium outcomes, I estimate the parameters of the model in two stages.
First, I use individual-level data on media exposure (from Simmons) to estimate the
media-speciﬁc parameters, Υ, that measure how exposure varies with observable consumer
attributes. These parameters are estimated separately using maximum likelihood.
Then the remainder of the parameters, {β,θ,η,ηAD}, are estimated simultaneously by
generalized method of simulated moments (GMM). There are four “sets” of moments:
(i) Moments arising from the demand side, which ﬁt the model’s predictions for product j’s
market share to its observed market shares
(ii) Moments arising from ﬁrm’s pricing decisions, which express an orthogonality between
t h ec o s ts i d eu n o b s e r v a b l eωj and appropriate instruments
(iii) Moments arising from the ﬁrms advertising media choices, which express an orthogo-
nality between the advertising residuals (constructed so as to allow for corner solutions)
and the instruments
(iv) Moments arising from individual-level data on manufacturer choice, which match the
model’s predictions for the probability of a purchase from ﬁrm f (conditional on con-
sumer and product characteristics) to observed purchases from the Simmons data
Before discussing the moments in more detail, I outline the method used to control for
heterogeneity in household media exposure, which results in the ﬁrst-stage estimate of Υ.
214.1 Individual Media Exposure
The information technology is a function of consumer attributes, product attributes, and
parameters and is given by
φijt(θφ,Υ)=
exp(τijt)
1+e x p( τijt)




jt(ϕ + ρajt + Ψf + ΥD
s
it + κi)l n κi ∼ N(0,I m)
I have data on respondents’ exposure to media from Simmons, which I use to ﬁrst estimate
the Υ parameters by maximum likelihood.33 This subsection concerns the ﬁrst stage of the
estimation procedure. Once I obtain an estimate of Υ, the value of these parameters remain
constant for the remainder of the estimation process. For ease of exposition, I suppress the
time subscript below.
Recall that the Simmons survey reports only the quintile to which the consumer belongs,
therefore I construct an ordered-response likelihood function which I use to obtain an esti-
mate of Υ. Let Yim be the amount of exposure individual i has to medium m and let Ds
i be




i Υm + εim
and εim is a mean zero stochastic term with an i.i.d. standard normal distribution. Deﬁning
quintile one as the highest, the consumer belongs to the qth quintile in medium m if cqm <
33 This two-step estimation procedure can be motivated as follows. The probability that consumer i is




[1 − Pr(Iijm | ajm,D i)]
where Pr(Iijm | ajm,D i) is the probability that i is informed about product j through medium m.U s i n g
Bayes’ law, this probability can be written as Pr(Iijm | ajm,D i,Mim =1 ) P r ( Mim =1| ajm,D i) where
Mim =1if i is exposed to medium m and 0 otherwise (with Pr(Iijm | ajm,D i,Mim =0 )=0 ) .A s -
suming consumer characteristics explain exposure to advertising media but do not aﬀect the probability of
being informed conditional on media exposure, Pr(Iijm | ajm,D i) can be written as Pr(Iijm | ajm,Mim =
1)Pr(Mim =1| ajm,D i).S i n c e t h e ﬁrst probability in the product is not a function of consumer charac-
teristics, the Υ parameters can be estimated separately.
22Yim <c (q−1)m, where cqm and Υm are parameters. Let Ziqm be an indicator function equal
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I estimate the dsim-dimensional parameter vector Υm separately for each medium. The
estimates remain constant throughout the remainder of the estimation procedure. There are
two implicit assumptions in this process. The ﬁr s ti st h a tt h ee r r o rt e r m sa r ei n d e p e n d e n t
across media and the second that the errors associated with estimating Υ are independent
of the errors associated with the rest of the model.
4.2 The Moments
I use individual and product level data to ﬁt moments predicted by the model to their data
analogs. First, I discuss the derivation of demand and marginal cost unobservables used in
the ﬁrst two sets of moments. The derivation of these moments follows the algorithm used
in BLP. Then I discuss the role of corner solutions and the resulting (third set of ) moments
associated with advertising media choices. Finally, I explain the role of the individual-level
data in constructing the fourth set of micro moments.
BLP-Type Moments Following BLP, I restrict the model predictions for product j’s
market share to match the observed market shares.
S
obs
t − st(δ,θ)=0 , (14)
where Sobs
t and st are the vectors of observed and predicted market shares, respectively. I
solve for the mean utility vector δ(S,θ) that is the implicit solution to (14). I substitute
23δ(S,θ) for δ when calculating the models predictions for the moments discussed in the re-
mainder of this section.34 Using δ(S,θ), I solve for the demand side unobservable used in
the ﬁrst moment
ξjt = δjt(S,θ) − x
0
jβ. (15)
In vector form, the J ﬁrst-order conditions from (12) are
s − ∆(p − mc)=0
where ∆j,r = −∂sr
∂pjIj,r with Ij,r an indicator function equal to one when j and r are produced
by the same ﬁrm and zero otherwise. These FOC’s imply marginal costs given by
mc = p − ∆
−1s (16)
Following in the tradition of the new empirical IO (Bresnahan, 1989), I use the estimates of
the demand system to compute the marginal costs implied by equation (10). The production
cost side unobservable used in the second moment is obtained by combining equations (16)
together with equation (10) and rewriting as follows
ω =l n ( p − ∆
−1s) − w
0η (17)
where ∆ and s are functions θ and δ.
Advertising Moments (Corner Solutions) The third set of moments arises from ﬁrm’s
optimal advertising media choices. If products were advertised in all media, construction of
these moments would be more straightforward. However, some ﬁr m sc h o o s en o tt oa d v e r t i s e
34 I use a contraction mapping suggested by BLP to compute the vector δ (S,θ). Under mild conditions
on the distribution of consumer tastes Berry(1994) shows that there is a unique relationship between the
choice of the vector δ and the vector of market shares predicted by the model, s(δ,θ).
24some products in some media. To construct moments that allow for corner solutions, I use
a method proposed by Gourieroux et al.(1987).
The method is best illustrated by considering a simple example. Let y∗
i denote the latent
variable, where y∗
i = xiβ + ui. We observe the latent variable if y∗
i ≥ 0, and 0 otherwise.
The errors, ui(β), are linked with the latent variables y∗
i. Since they depend on unobserved
variables, the errors cannot be used in constructing moments. Gourieroux et al. suggest an
alternative method: replace the errors by their best prediction conditional on the observable
variables, E[ui(β) | yi], and use these to construct moments.
In this paper, the latent variables are optimal advertising levels and, due to non-linearities,
the application is more complicated, but the technique is the same. Let a∗







jm if ∂Πj/∂ajm |ajm=a∗
jm=0
0 if ∂Πj/∂ajm |ajm=0< 0
where Πj is the proﬁt associated with product j given in equation (9). For ease of exposition
rewrite the advertising medium FOC (equation 13) as
ln(hjm(ajm)) − w
ad0
jmψ = υjm (18)
where hjm is the marginal revenue associated with advertising medium m (the left-hand side
of equation 13). The latent variable, a∗
jm, is the implicit solution to equation (18). In
this context the errors, υjm, cannot be used since they depend on the latent variable a∗
jm.
Instead, I use the best prediction of the errors conditional on the observed level of advertising
to construct moments.
Following the method proposed by Gourieroux et al.(1987), to allow for corner solutions I
construct moments arising from a tobit likelihood function. Using the marginal costs asso-
ciated with advertising media (equation 11) and the interior ﬁrst order conditions (equation




















where φ is the standard normal pdf and Φ is the cumulative standard normal. Due to
computational complexity I must be parsimonious in my choice of parameters, therefore in




1(ajm > 0)lnφ(e hjm)+1 ( ajm =0 )l n
³
1 − Φ(e hjm)
´
The generalized residual for the jth observation is
e υjm(b Θ)=E[υjm(b Θ) | ajm]
where Θ are the parameters associated with equation (18) and b Θ its maximum likelihood
estimator. The generalized residual is then
e υjm = e hjm1(ajm > 0) −
φ(e hjm)
1 − Φ(e hjm)
1(ajm =0 )
The (third set of ) moments express an orthogonality between the generalized residuals








is the MOM estimator, where
∂e hjm
∂Θ are the appropriate instruments. Let T (δ,mc,θ,ηAD)
be the vector formed by stacking the residuals over media and over products. I use the
resulting sample moments to construct a GMM estimator.
Micro Moments The Simmons Survey of Media and Markets consists of a sample of
consumers, their characteristics, and their manufacturer purchase information. Up until
this point the Simmons data have been used only to estimate the Υ, in calculating the
26other moments demographic characteristics were given by the CPS. The micro-moments are
constructed using individual level purchase data from the Simmons survey. Therefore the
demographic characteristics for the micro-moments are not given by the CPS, but are linked
directly to purchases as detailed in the Simmons data (denoted Ds). Since these moments
are constructed from individual purchase data one can think of them as being particularly
i n f o r m a t i v ea b o u tt h ep a r a m e t e r so ft h et a s t ed i s t r i b u t i o n( Π and Σ).
Recall the survey reports only the ﬁrm from which the PC was purchased. Let Bi be a
F × 1 vector of ﬁrm choices for individual i.L e t bi be a realization of Bi where bif =1if
a brand produced by ﬁrm f was chosen. Deﬁne the residual as the diﬀerence between the
vector of observed choices in the data and the model prediction given (δ,θ). The residual
for individual i,d e n o t e dGi(δ,θ), can be written as
Gi(δ,θ)=bi − Eν,κE[Bi | D
s
i,δ,θ] (20)
For example, the element of Eν,κE[Bi | Ds















r∈S exp{δrt + µirt}
dFν(ν)dFκ(κ)
where the ﬁrst summand is over all the products sold by ﬁrm 2, t h ei n t e g r a li so v e rt h e
assumed distributions of unobserved consumer attributes (ν and κ), and the second summand
is over all the diﬀerent choice sets that include product j. The population restriction for the
micro moment is E[Gi(δ,θ) | (X,ξ)] = 0. Let G(δ,θ) be the vector formed by stacking the
residuals Gi(δ,θ) over individuals.35
4.3 Identiﬁcation
In this section, I present an informal discussion of how variation in the data identiﬁes the
parameters of the model. I begin with the parameters of the demand side. Recall that
associated with each PC is a mean utility, δj = x0
jβ +ξj, which is chosen to match observed
35 The Simmons sample is annual so in estimation the outermost summand is over all products sold by
each ﬁrm over the course of the year.
27and predicted market shares. Heterogeneity in consumers tastes around the mean is given
by αln(yit − pjt)+xj
0(ΠDit + Σνi). I fc o n s u m e r sw e r ei d e n t i c a l ,t h e na l lv a r i a t i o ni ns a l e s
w o u l db ed r i v e nb yv a r i a t i o ni np r o d u c ta t t r i b u t e s . V a r i a t i o ni np r o d u c tm a r k e ts h a r e s
corresponding to variation in the observable attributes of those products (such as CPU
speed) is used to identify the parameters of mean utility (β). However, while a PC may
have attributes that are preferred by many consumers (high β’s), the PC may also have
attributes that appeal to certain types of consumers. For instance, if children like to play
PC video games, then consumers from large households may place a higher valuation on
CPU speed relative to smaller households.
Identiﬁcation of the parameters of the taste distribution (Σ,Π) relies on information
on how consumers substitute. There are two issues that merit attention. First, new
product introductions are common in the PC industry.36 Variation of this sort is helpful
particularly for identiﬁcation of the variance in tastes. Since the distribution of unobserved
consumer heterogeneity is ﬁxed over time, variation in sales patterns over time as the choice
sets change allows for identiﬁcation of Σ. Second, I augment the market level data with
individual level data on manufacturer choice. The extra information in the micro data helps
with identiﬁcation. That is, it allows variation in choices to mirror variation in tastes for
product attributes. Correlation between xjDi and choices identiﬁes the Π parameters.
The information technology (φ) describes the eﬀectiveness of an ad at informing con-
sumers. Most of the variation in φ (and the induced variation in market shares) is due to
variation in advertising. The model should incorporate the impact of media-speciﬁca d -
vertising on φ and its diﬀering eﬀect across households (Υ). One major drawback of the
aggregate advertising data is that I don’t observe variation across households. However,
observed variation in market shares corresponding to variation in household ad media ex-
posure is necessary to identify the Υ matrix. Fortunately, the individual-level data contain
useful information on media exposure across households. Using the Simmons data, and
36 I assume that this is exogenous variation as is common in the literature.
28taking media exposure as a proxy for ad exposure, I estimate the Υ separately by maximum
likelihood. Covariation in observable consumer characteristics and choices of media exposure
identiﬁes the Υ. The use of the Simmon’s data allows me to side-step the need for observed
ad heterogeneity across households.
Variation in sales corresponding to variation in advertising identiﬁes the remainder of the
parameters of φ. Returns to scale in media advertising (ρm) are identiﬁed by covariation
in sales with the variance of ajm.T h e r e l a t i v e e ﬀectiveness of advertising in diﬀerent
media (ϕm)i si d e n t i ﬁed by any variation in sales due to variation in ajm, which is constant
across households (and not explained by returns to scale). Conditioning on ΥDs, any extra
variation across individuals due to extra ajm that is not explained by the model is captured
in κim : unobserved heterogeneity with regard to ad medium eﬀectiveness. The parameter
Ψf is identiﬁed by additional variation in ﬁrm market shares due to advertising that is
not explained by other elements in φ. That is, it captures the fact that some ﬁrms are
more eﬀective at informing consumers through advertising, where this “extra” eﬀectiveness
is independent of media or households. Finally, the parameters on group advertising (γ
and π) are identiﬁed by covariation in average medium advertising per product (adm) over
time and by functional form assumptions (relative to what a logit speciﬁcation would imply
for the parameter values in the case of the outside good). The other parameters of the
information technology function which do not interact with advertising (λ) are separately
identiﬁed from Π due to non-linearities in the model.
Variation in prices and markets shares corre s p o n d i n gt ov a r i a t i o ni no b s e r v e dc o s tc h a r -
acteristics identiﬁes the corresponding cost characteristics’ eﬀect on production costs. Co-
variation in advertising prices, advertising and the generalized residuals identiﬁes the eﬀect
of advertising prices on advertising costs.
294.4 The GMM Estimator






where A is an appropriate weighting matrix which is a consistent estimate of E[Z0ΛΛ0Z] and
Z are instruments orthogonal to the composite error term Λ. Speciﬁcally if Zξ,Z ω,Z ad,Z micro
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where Zξ,j is column j of Zξ. Joint estimation of the parameters takes into account the cross-
equation restrictions on the parameters that aﬀect both demand and supply, which yields
more eﬃcient estimates. This comes at the cost of increased computation time since joint
estimation requires a non-linear search over all the parameters of the model. As in Nevo
(2000), I restrict the non-linear search to a subset of the parameters Ω = {θ,ηAD}, reducing
the searching time. This restriction is possible since the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect
to β and η can be expressed in terms of θ.37
Instruments The estimation method outlined above requires instruments that are corre-
lated with speciﬁc functions of the observed data, but not correlated with the disturbances.
That is, appropriate instruments satisfy (i) E[Λ | Z]=0and (ii) Z0E[ΛΩ]/NM converges
to a nonsingular matrix where NM i st h es a m p l es i z ea n dΛΩ = ∂Λ/∂Ω. The discussion
37 I provide the details in Appendix A.
30surrounding the instruments used in estimation proceeds as follows. First, I discuss as-
sumptions I make regarding the relationship between unobservables and observables and the
implications of these assumptions, then I discuss endogeneity issues, the form of optimal
instruments, and ﬁnally the exogenous instruments I use, which are an approximation to
optimal instruments.
A common assumption made in the literature regards the relationship between unobserv-
able and observable characteristics. Namely, the unobservables associated with demand and
pricing (evaluated at the true value of the parameters) are assumed to be mean independent





= E [ωj | (x,w)] = 0 (21)
In choosing which variables to include in the conditioning vector I look for observables that
shift demand and cost functions. As can be seen from pricing ﬁrst-order conditions in
equation (12), the optimal price for product j depends upon characteristics of all of the
products oﬀered. Products which face more competition (due to more rivals oﬀering similar
products) will tend to have lower markups relative to more diﬀerentiated products. Similarly
from the advertising FOCs in equation (13) we see that advertising for product j also depends
in part on the markup for product j.A ﬁrm will tend to advertise a product more the more
they make on the sale of the product. The optimal price and advertising for product j
depends upon the characteristics, prices, and advertising of all products marketed. Thus
the optimal instruments associated with product j will include functions of attributes and
cost shifters of all other products.
It is important to note that the moment restriction in equation (21) has nontrivial eco-
nomic implications. Indeed while some product characteristics may be uncorrelated with
unobserved attributes (such as CPU speed), others such as prices and advertising are likely
to be correlated with unobserved attributes. Recall that the econometrician does not ob-
serve the product characteristic ξj or the cost characteristic ωj, but market participants do.
For example, ξj could represent unobserved product quality, which ﬁrms observe and base
31pricing and product advertising decisions upon. This leads to endogeneity problems since
prices and advertising choices are most likely functions of unobserved characteristics. If
the correlation between unobserved characteristics (ξj and ωj) and prices and advertising is
ignored, it will lead to biased estimates. For example, if price is positively correlated with
unobserved quality, price coeﬃcients (in absolute value) will be understated (as preliminary
estimates indicate, see section (5)). Whereas if advertising is positively correlated with
quality, advertising’s eﬀect will be overstated.
Berry (1994) was the ﬁrst to discuss the implementation of instrumental variables meth-
ods to correct for endogeneity between unobserved characteristics and prices, and BLP pro-
vide an estimation technique. My model and estimation strategy is in this spirit but is
adapted to correct for advertising endogeneity.
Given the mean independence assumption above and some additional regularity condi-
tions, Chamberlain (1987) shows the optimal instrument for any disturbance-parameter pair
is the expected value of the derivative of the disturbance with respect to the parameters
(evaluated at the true value of the parameters, Ω0). That is, the optimal instrument for
each parameter is one that places more weight on the disturbances that are most sensitive
to changes in the parameter value (at Ω = Ω0). Consider the optimal instruments for the














evaluated at a consistent estimate for Ω0.38 Product characteristics are optimal instruments
for the demand side β parameters, and likewise cost characteristics are optimal instruments
for the η cost parameters. However, the optimal instruments for the other parameters are
functions of either prices or advertising. Due to endogeneity of price and advertising the
expectations given in equation (22) will be correlated with the disturbances, that is (i) is












32violated. Similarly, the optimal instruments for the advertising and micro residuals are
functions of price and advertising.
Since the derivatives are functions of advertising and prices, to calculate the optimal
instruments I would have to calculate the pricing and advertising equilibrium for diﬀerent
{ξj,ωj} sequences, compute the derivatives at equilibrium values, and integrate out over the
distribution of the {ξj,ωj} sequences. This is computationally demanding and perhaps more
importantly, requires additional assumptions on the joint distribution (ξ,ω).
Instead of computing the optimal instruments, I form approximations to them. The
approach I take is in the spirit of BLP(1999). While the optimal instruments are the
expectation of the derivative of the disturbance, the approximations are formed by evaluating
the derivatives at the expected value of the unobservables (i.e. at ξ = ω =0 ) .T h e e s t i m a t e
of the instruments will be biased since the derivatives evaluated at the expected values are
not the expected value of the derivatives. However the approximations are functions of
exogenous data, and are constructed such that they are highly correlated with the relevant
functions of prices and advertising. Hence the exogenous instruments will be consistent
estimates of the optimal instruments.39
The method used to construct the exogenous instruments is as follows:
(i) Construct initial instruments for prices (b pint) and advertising.40
(ii) Use the initial instruments to obtain an initial estimate of the parameters, b Ω.
(iii) Construct estimates of δ,m c , and mcad. I used b δ = xb β , ln(c mc)=wb η, and ln(c mc
ad)=
wadb ψ.
(iv) Solve the ﬁrst-order conditions for equilibrium advertising, b a, as a function of b Ω,b δ, c mc,
39 BLP(1995) show that variables that shift markups are valid instruments in models of diﬀerentiated
products markets. One could also use a series approximation as in BLP to construct exogenous instruments.
I chose to use the approximation method outlined above since it is more closely tied to the model.
40 I constructed a distance variable based on observables and used kernel estimates for prices and adver-
tising as the initial instruments. BLP-type instruments would also work for prices.
33c mc
ad, b pint and x.
(v) Solve the ﬁrst-order conditions of the model for equilibrium prices, b p, as a function of
b Ω,b δ, c mc, b a, and x.
(vi) These imply a value for predicted market shares, b s,w h i c hi saf u n c t i o no fb Ω, b p,b δ, b a and
x.
(vii) Calculate the required disturbance-parameter pair derivatives.41
(viii) Repeat steps (iv)-(vii) where each time the new b pint is replaced by the b p found from
t h ep r e v i o u sr o u n d .
(iv) Form approximations to the optimal instruments by taking the average of the exogenous
derivatives found in step (vii)
Simulation There are two separate reasons why I must simulate market shares. First,
as is common in many papers using random coeﬃcient models of demand, I use an empirical
distribution to deﬁne the distribution of consumer demographics. As a result there is no
analytical solution for predicted market shares, even if one assumes consumers are aware of
all products for sale. Second, consumers may not know of products for sale, but I don’t
observe the choice set they face when making a purchase decision. Due to the large number
of products in the PC industry, it is not feasible to calculate all possible purchase probabilities
for each product corresponding to each of the 2J possible choice sets. Instead I simulate a
choice set for each individual in each period and construct an importance sampler to smooth
the simulated choice probabilities.
A general outline of the simulation technique follows (for more detail see Appendix B). I
sample a set of “individuals” where each individual consists of (vi1,...,v ik) taste parameters
drawn from a multivariate normal; demographic characteristics, (yi,D i1,...,D id) drawn
41 These are
∂b ξj(b p,b a,b s,b δ,x,b Ω)
∂Ω ,
∂b ωj(b p,b a,b s,b δ,c mc,x,b Ω)
∂Ω ,
∂b e h(b p,b a,b s,b δ,b Ω)
∂Ω and
∂ b G(b p,b a,b s,b δ,b Ω)
∂Ω .
34f r o mt h eC P Si nt h ec a s eo ft h em a c r o - m o m e n t sa n dd a t ai nt h ec a s eo ft h em i c r o - m o m e n t s ;
and unobserved advertising medium eﬀectiveness draws (κi1,...,κim) from a multivariate
log normal.42
For the macro moments, for each individual, I draw J uniform random variables. For a
given value of the parameters, I compute the probability each consumer is informed about
each product (φij). Then I construct a choice set for each individual by comparing her
vector of φi’s with her uniform draws and compute choice probabilities. I construct an
importance sampler by using the initial choice set weight to smooth the simulated choice
probabilities.43 The simulator for the market share is the average over individuals of these
smoothed choice probabilities. The process is similar for the micro moments, but I take R
draws for each individual. I construct a simulator for individual product choice probabilities
which is the average over the R draws. I construct individual ﬁrm choice probabilities by
summing over the products oﬀered by each ﬁrm.
The Estimation Algorithm and Properties of the Estimator In summary, in the
ﬁrst stage I calculate the Υ parameters by maximum likelihood and hold them constant
for the duration of estimation procedure. In the second stage, I employ the following
estimation algorithm. Given a value of the parameters, Ω (1) Compute (via simulation)
t h em a r k e ts h a r e si m p l i e db yt h em o d e l( s e ee q u a t i o n6 )( 2 )S o l v ef o rt h ev e c t o rδ that
equates simulated market shares and observed shares (3) Calculate β and compute the
vector of demand unobservables ξ (see equation 15) (4) Calculate η and compute the cost
side unobservable, ω (see equation 17) (5) Compute the ad residual implied by the tobit
likelihood function T (6) Compute (via simulation) the ﬁrm purchase probabilities implied
by the model (7) Calculate the micro moment residual (see equation 20) (8) Calculate the
42 I sample 3000 individuals each year from the March CPS for the macro moments. For the micro
moments, I sample 6700 individuals each year from the 20,000 surveyed.
43 The initial choice set weight is the product over all the φ’s for products in the choice set (computed
at the initial value of the parameters) multiplied by the product of (1 − φ) for all the products not in the
choice set.
35instruments and interact them with the macro disturbances and micro residuals. Hold
the instruments ﬁxed at these values for the duration of the estimation. (9) Search for the





where b Λ is the composite error term resulting from simulated moments. If the parameters
don’t minimize the moments (according to some criteria) make a new guess of the parameters.
Repeat until moments are close to zero.44
Using the results of Pakes and Pollard (1989), this estimator is consistent and asymp-
totically normal. As the number of psuedo random draws used in simulation R →∞ ,
the method of simulated moments covariance matrix approaches the method of moments
covariance matrix. To reduce the variance associated with simulation, I employ antithetic
acceleration as described in the simulation literature (for an overview of simulation tech-
niques see Stern, 1997 and 2000). Geweke (1988) shows if antithetic acceleration is im-
plemented during simulation then the loss in precision is of order 1/N (where N are the
number of observations), which requires no adjustment to the asymptotic covariance matrix.
The reported (asymptotic) standard errors are derived from the inverse of the simulated
information matrix which allows for possible heteroskedasticity.45
5 Preliminary Analysis
Before estimating the full-model, I conduct a series of logit and probit regressions, which
allows me to examine in a simple framework how advertising impacts demand and supply
and guides the choice of variables to include in the structural analysis.46
44 I use BHHH derivative based optimization routine to obtain parameter estimates. To obtain a smooth
simulator (necessary in order to use derivative based optimization algorithms), I construct an importance
sampler. This sampler uses the initial choice set weight to smooth choice probabilities.
45 The reported standard errors do not included additional variance due to simulation error.
46 While reduced-form estimation is computationally easy, structural analysis has many advantages. It
provides estimates that are invariant to changes in policy or competitive factors. Another advantage is
36First I estimate a series of probit models of the decision to purchase a PC using the
individual-level Simmons data (see Table 5). I started by allowing for many explanatory
variables, including interactions between consumer attributes, education and income splines,
and media exposure variables.47 I found the consumer attributes which matter most are
age, education, and marital status. Household income and size also signiﬁcantly aﬀect the
probability of purchase, although including the presence and/or number of kids does not
improve the ﬁt.
The estimates in the ﬁrst two columns suggest media exposure eﬀects the decision to
buy a PC, controlling for observed consumer covariates.48 Results from a likelihood ratio
test (columns three and four) suggest that exposure to TV and magazine media impact the
decision the most.49 Results with no media exposure variables (ﬁnal two columns) indicate
that media exposure does matter. Indeed, we can reject the hypothesis that media exposure
has no eﬀect on PC purchase at a smaller than 0.01 signiﬁcance level.
I next estimate a multinomial logit model of demand to study the eﬀects of advertising
on product choice using all datasets. Due to data restrictions I estimate a model of man-







where Xf includes product characteristics (such as average weighted price, average weighted
CPU speed, proportion of pentium processors, and proportion of laptops), manufacturer
that it allows one to specify the eﬀects of advertising. If advertising aﬀects a consumers choice set, we
would expected changes in consumer behavior as advertising changes. This eﬀect of a limited choice set is
not captured in non-structural models since it is not possible to be speciﬁc about how advertising aﬀects
demand. Also, we would expect changes in ﬁrm behavior as variables relating to advertising change, which
will have an impact on markups and prices.
47 Table available on request.
48 There may be unobserved consumer attributes which inﬂuence media exposure. I account for this
possibility in the structural model, which allows for unobserved consumer heterogeneity in media eﬀectiveness
in the information technology (these are the κi from section 3.2).
49 The ﬁnal rows present the results from likelihood ratio tests. We cannot reject the hypothesis that all
other media have no impact on purchase probabilities.
37characteristics (such as advertising expenditures), and manufacturer speciﬁc parameters,
βf.
Selected results are given in Table 6.50 In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation (column one), the only
explanatory variable is price. All coeﬃcient estimates are positive and signiﬁcant (except for
Epson). The most obvious explanation is that prices are correlated with quality: it appears
consumers prefer a higher price, when most likely they prefer a higher quality product Even
after including CPU type, CPU speed, and laptop as explanatory variables, the majority
of the price coeﬃcients are still positive. This suggests there are product attributes (in
addition to those mentioned) that are positively correlated with prices.
In a second speciﬁcation (column two), I include total advertising expenditures as an
explanatory variable. The speciﬁcation with advertising ﬁts the data better than those
without advertising. Indeed, it ﬁts better than the speciﬁcation with product characteristics
included even though there are fewer explanatory variables. Without specifying how adver-
tising aﬀects demand, the coeﬃcient estimates indicate that advertising may be correlated
with higher quality. This obtains from comparing the estimates in the ﬁrst two columns,
the price coeﬃcients in the speciﬁcation with advertising are much smaller. It seems that
advertising may be picking up some of the eﬀect of unobserved product attributes. As
is common in the empirical IO literature, I will account for the possibility that unobserved
attributes are correlated with prices and correct for the possible correlation with advertising.
I also ran speciﬁcations broken down across advertising media. The results are given in
the ﬁnal column of Table 6. I found advertising’s eﬀect on manufacturer choice diﬀers across
media. The coeﬃcient estimates indicate that advertising in magazines and newspapers
has a positive (and signiﬁcant) eﬀect on choice for almost all PC manufacturers. Recall,
consumer level probit estimates suggest exposure to TV and magazine media mattered in
50 I estimate the parameters for two separate deﬁnitions of the ‘outside’ good. Under the ﬁrst speciﬁcation
the outside good encompasses no purchase of a new PC. Under the second, it encompasses no purchase of
one of the 15 inside options. The results did not diﬀer greatly, so I report the results under the second more
broad deﬁnition of the outside good.
38the decision of whether to purchase a PC. Finally, I ﬁnd that, after controlling for observed
consumer covariates, advertising still inﬂuences the decision of manufacturer choice.
6 Structural Estimation Results
I use results from the preliminary regressions to guide the choice of which consumer and
product variables to include. While there are many viable characteristics, I must be parsi-
monious in my choice, due to the computational complexity of the model. Included product
characteristics (xj) are CPU speed (MHz), a dummy for whether the computer has a Pentium
chip, a dummy for whether the computer is a laptop, ﬁrm level ﬁxed eﬀects, and a constant.
CPU speed and Pentium are measures of computational speed and laptop is a measure of
convenience. In all tables, the (asymptotic) standard errors are given in parentheses.
The structural results are broken down into three categories. First, I discuss the im-
portance of product diﬀerentiation and the substitution patterns present in the PC market.
Next, I discuss the importance of advertising: its inﬂuence on consumers, and implications
for ﬁrm behavior and the resulting nature of competition. Finally, I discuss results which
highlight the importance of information in the PC industry and contrast these with results
from diﬀerent base-line models in which consumers are completely informed.
Diﬀerentiation and Substitution Patterns Not surprisingly, the results indicate there
is much variation across consumers with respect to product attributes. (Recall from the
model that the marginal utility of product attributes varies across consumers.) I estimate
the means and the standard deviations of the taste distribution for CPU speed, Pentium,
and laptop. The mean coeﬃcients (β) are given in the ﬁrst column, ﬁrst panel in Table
7. Estimates of heterogeneity around these means are presented in the next few columns.
The means of CPU speed and laptop are positive and signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on the
interaction of CPU speed with household size is signiﬁcant, while the other coeﬃcients on
interactions with demographics (Π) are insigniﬁcant. The results imply that the product
39characteristics CPU speed and laptop have a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the distribution of
the utilities. In addition, the marginal valuation for CPU speed is increasing in household
size (3.9). This result is intuitive since children often use the PC to play games (which
require higher CPU speeds).
None of the coeﬃcients for the Pentium dummy are signiﬁc a n t . T h i si sas o m e w h a t
surprising result and suggests that once you control for CPU speed (and other product
characteristics) consumers don’t place extra value on whether the chip is a Pentium. During
the period considered in this study 80% of PCs had a Pentium chip; the AMD chip was not
yet a strong market contender. In that light, the results may not be so surprising.
The non-random coeﬃcient results are also presented in the ﬁrst panel. The coeﬃcient
on ln(y−p) is of the expected sign and is highly signiﬁcant (1.2). Firm ﬁxed eﬀect estimates
indicate that the marginal valuation for a product is higher if it is produced by Apple, Dell,
IBM or Packard Bell. This could capture prestige-eﬀects of owning a computer produced by
one of top ﬁrms (Apple, IBM, and Packard Bell). Apple operates on a diﬀerent platform,
so Apple ﬁxed eﬀects could reﬂect the extra valuation consumers on average place on the
Apple platform. Finally, they could capture extra valuation consumers place on enhanced
services oﬀered by the ﬁrms (for instance Dell is known for its excellent consumer service)
or other reputational eﬀects.
The estimated parameters have important implications for pricing behavior and markups.
Table 8 presents a sample from 1998 of own- and cross-price elasticities of demand. Elas-
ticities are computed by multiplying the numerical derivative of estimated demand by price
and dividing by actual sales. The table shows all negative elements on the diagonal. Con-
sistent with oligopolistic conduct, the results indicate that the products are priced in the
elastic portion of the demand curve. The substitution patterns implied by these elasticities
are intuitive. The results show that products are more sensitive to changes in prices of
computers with similar characteristics. For example, Apple computers are most sensitive
to changes in the prices of other Apple computers, implying there is less substitution across
40platforms. Among PC’s that have a windows operating system, form factor plays a strong
role in driving substitution patterns. For example, Compaq Presario laptop is most sensitive
to changes in prices of other laptops rather than to changes in other Compaq non-laptop
computers. These patterns are consistent across the data.
Diﬀerentiation and Advertising The eﬀect of advertising also varies across consumers.
The eﬀect of advertising on a consumers information set is determined by the information
technology function. I estimate some of the parameters of the information technology
separately before the rest of the model (Υ). The parameter estimates, given in Table
9, measure how medium exposure varies with observed demographic characteristics. The
coeﬃcients can be used to proxy for eﬀectiveness of ads in reaching consumers through
various media. The results indicate that exposure varies across media and households. The
parameter estimates suggest magazine advertisements are most eﬀective at reaching mature,
high income individuals and the eﬀectiveness is increasing in household size. Newspaper
advertising is most eﬀe c t i v ea tr e a c h i n gm a r r i e di n d i v i d u a l sa b o v et h ea g eo f3 0w h oh a v e
a high income. However, newspaper advertising is less likely to reach a family the larger
is their household size (-0.03). Hence, newspaper advertising targeted at large households
would not be eﬀective in increasing the probability of being informed for this particular
cohort. Perhaps not surprisingly, TV advertising is the most eﬀective media for reaching
low-income households. Television advertising is also eﬀective at reaching mature, married
individuals, although not as eﬀective as newspaper advertising. Most of the advertising in
the PC industry is in magazines; this suggests PC manufacturers are targeting high-income
households.
Some products are advertised in groups while others are advertised individually. The
coeﬃcient estimates on group advertising (γ) and group advertising squared (π) are given
in the second panel of Table 7. These (unrestricted) estimates predict that we will observe
both group advertising and product-speciﬁc advertising, which is supported by the data.
41The estimate on advertising squared (0.09) indicates there are economies of scope in group
advertising. Speciﬁcally, the estimates imply that if average group ad expenditures (ad) for
a particular product group are above a threshold level of $1.4 million per quarter51 (either
the advertising expenditures for a group are high or the groups are small) the ﬁrm will ﬁnd
it worthwhile to engage in group advertising to capitalize on the returns to scope. To put
this into context, in the ﬁrst quarter of 1998 Apple’s advertising strategy involved 18 group
advertisements. The parameter estimates suggest we would observe 18 group advertisements
only if Apple’s home-sector advertising budget was at least $25 million. As we see from
Table 2, Apple spent over $180 million in advertising in 1998, and more than 25$ million of
that was in the ﬁrst quarter — consistent with the model prediction.
The information technology coeﬃcients are presented in the third panel of Table 7. Con-
sumers may be informed without seeing any advertisements. The coeﬃcient estimate for
income less than $60,000 (dummy variable for low income), 0.48, indicates that low income
individuals are likely to be informed about 38% of the products without seeing any adver-
tisement. Having a high income is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from having a middle income
in terms of being informed. This is perhaps not surprising since low income individuals are
likely to have lower opportunity costs of time and thus more time to search for information
about available products. The coeﬃcient estimate for high school graduate, implies that
the probability of being informed without seeing any advertising is higher for high-school
graduates relative to non-high school graduates. These results suggest that other means
of information provision, such as word-of-mouth or experience play a role in informing con-
sumers in this market.
The results also indicate that there are decreasing returns to advertising in the tv (-0.03)
and newspapers and magazines (-0.02) media, but that they are decreasing at a faster rate for
tv advertising. Estimates of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects interacted with advertising (Ψ) indicate that
some ﬁrms are more eﬀective at informing consumers through advertising. Most notably,
51 The ad threshold is (1 − γ)/π.
42ads by Compaq, Gateway, IBM and Packard Bell are signiﬁcantly more eﬀective, which could
arise due to diﬀerences in advertising techniques.
Estimated advertising elasticities of demand indicate that, for some ﬁrms, advertising
one product has negative eﬀects on other products sold by that ﬁrm, but it is less negative
than for some of the rival products. Table 10 presents a sample from 1997. Each semi-
elasticity gives the percentage change in the market share of the row computer associated
with a $1000 increase in the advertising of the column computer. For instance, a $1000
increase in advertising for Apple Macintosh computers results in a decreased market share of
around 0.1% for Compaq Presario brand computers, but has very little eﬀect on the market
share for Apple PowerBook computers.52 In contrast, an increase in advertising for Dell
L a t i t u d eh a sal a r g ee ﬀect (relative to increase in own market share of less than 0.01%) on
the market share for Dell Dimension computers (decline of 0.04%).
The cost and non-home sector estimates are given in Table 11. The marginal cost
of production estimates are given in the ﬁrst panel. Most of the coeﬃcients (η) are of the
expected sign and are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The estimates indicate marginal costs
are declining over time and increases in CPU speed or oﬀering a laptop increase marginal
costs. The only variable with an unexpected sign is Pentium (-0.39), the negative sign
indicates that PCs with a Pentium chip are cheaper to produce. The coeﬃcient estimates
for log marginal cost of advertising is given in the second panel of Table 11. The coeﬃcient
on the (log) price of advertising (ψ) is highly signiﬁcant, and indicates that there are not
many product-speciﬁc cost characteristics that aﬀect the cost of advertising.
The parameter estimates associated with non-home sector marginal revenue are given in
the bottom panel. All coeﬃcients are positive and signiﬁcant. Recall, from the discussion
in section 2.2, that 50% of industry advertising expenditures are by IBM. My conjecture
that IBM’s advertising expenditures were so large (relative to other ﬁrms) was due to non-
52 The diagonal elements report the increase in market share from own-advertising. For example, an
increase of $1000 for advertising on Dell Dimension results in an increased market share of 0.03%.
43PC related enterprises seems to be supported by the data. I included non-PC sales in
the non-home marginal revenue speciﬁcation (last panel of Table 11) to adjust for the fact
that the measure of advertising includes that for non-PCs. Indeed the coeﬃcient on non-
PC sales (5) is signiﬁcant (although only at the 10% level) and positive. However, the
interaction term between IBM and advertising in the information technology function (0.62)
indicates that advertising by IBM is still more eﬀective relative to some other ﬁrms after
controlling for non-PC enterprises. If the IBM ﬁxed eﬀect in the information technology
were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero than I would have concluded that IBMs presence
in the non-PC sector fully explained their large advertising expenditures.
To gain more insight into the advertising choices of ﬁrms and to learn more about the
competitive nature of the PC industry, I use estimated demand to infer marginal costs and
markups. Summary statistics are given in Table 12. The median markup charged by
PC ﬁrms is 19% over marginal costs of production and 10% over per unit production and
(estimated) advertising costs. As can be seen from the ﬁrst two rows, the top ﬁrms have
higher than average markups and engage in higher than average advertising relative to the
total industry. Indeed, the non-top ﬁr m sa v e r a g em e d i a nm a r k u p si sam u c hl o w e r1 4 %
with an ad-to-sales ratio of about 2%. The ﬁnal column shows that even after controlling
for the fact that the top ﬁrms advertise more, they continue to earn higher than average
markups.
The bottom portion of the table gives detailed information for the top ﬁrms. Firms ad-
vertising choices are determined by their markup and their advertising elasticity of demand,
as can be seen from examining the advertising FOCs given in equation (13). IBM has one
of the highest ad-to-sales ratios. The advertising demand elasticities for IBM are not more
sensitive to advertising relative to other top ﬁrms, however, IBM markups are higher than
average. The results indicate that IBM is advertising more than the average non-top ﬁrm
because they earn more per product than the average non-top ﬁrm. Compaq, on the other
hand, has one of the highest markup margins, 24%, but still advertises less than average
44(although not less than the average non-top ﬁrm). As expected Compaq’s demand is less
sensitive to advertising relative to other ﬁrms in the industry, which is the driving factor in
their advertising decision. In addition, the table shows that Gateway has the highest median
price of the top ﬁrms, but earns lower than average markups. The lower markups are due
to higher than average costs, as reﬂected in a higher than average cost unobservable (ω),
suggesting they are not as cost-eﬀective in making their computers.
Information High industry markups are explained in part by the fact that consumers know
only some of the products for sale. If all consumers had full information (the assumption
made in the literature to date) the market would look very diﬀerent. Table 13 presents the
markups resulting from a model of limited information, to those predicted by traditional
consumer choice models. I estimated a benchmark BLP model for the baseline model of
comparision.53 Estimating the BLP model allows me to examine the additional markup
ﬁrms earn as a result of limited consumer information. The estimates indicate industry
median markups would be 5% under full information, one-fourth the magnitude of those
under limited information.
The bottom rows of Table 13 present markup comparisions broken down by top ﬁrms,
with some representative products for each ﬁrm. The model of limited information suggests
there is a larger markup gap between the top ﬁrms and the industry average relative to
the prediction under full information. Not surprisingly, the ﬁrm with the largest negative
percentage change in markups is IBM, the one that spends the most on advertising currently.
T h ee x t e n tt ow h i c haﬁrm in can exercise market power depends on the elasticity of its
demand curve. A comparision of estimated ﬁrm price elasticities for the top ﬁrms under
both models is given in Table 14. The greater the number of competitors or the larger the
cross-elasticity of demand with the products of other ﬁrms, the greater the elasticity of the
53 More accurately, I estimate a BLP model with micro-moments. Since my focus is on examining
the eﬀect of advertising, I include the micro-moments in estimating the BLP model to obtain as precise
estimates of the parameters of the taste distribution as possible given the data (see Petrin for more detail).
The parameter estimates are given in Appendix C.
45ﬁr m ’ sd e m a n dc u r v ea n dt h el e s si t sm a r k e tp o w e r .
The model of full information presents an image of an industry that is quite competitive,
and indicates markups are similar across the top ﬁrms. In addition, demand is very sensitive
to price changes and cross-elasticites imply the products are somewhat substitutable. How-
ever, if we remove the full information assumption the industry looks very diﬀerent. Firms
have much more market power as evidenced by the elasticities given along the diagonal in
the top panel. Also cross-price elasticities in the top panel indicate products are not as
substitutable. This is intuitive, if consumer know of fewer products than ﬁrms eﬀectively
face fewer competitors resulting in a less competitive industry. The results suggest that
traditional models of full-information yield estimates for product speciﬁc elasticities that are
biased towards being too elastic. Hence industry analysts could reach incorrect conclusions
regarding the nature of competition in an industry, if they use elasticities and markups based
on models of full information.
7S p e c i ﬁcation Tests
I examined the robustness of the informative advertising model by conducting a number
of goodness-of-ﬁt tests. First I tested whether all moments were satisﬁed. This test
is conditional on all the assumptions of the model and therefore tests the overidentifying
moment restrictions together with all the functional form and distributional assumptions.
By construction the objective function
Λ
0Z{ Est. Asy. Va r[Z
0Λ]}Z
0Λ
is a Wald statistic and is distributed chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number
of moment restrictions less the number of parameters. However, the test is stringent and
generally rejects for large samples. It is not surprising then, given the large sample size and
stylized nature of the model, that the model is rejected by the data.
I conducted additional goodness-of-ﬁt tests focused on various aspects of the model. To
46conduct the tests I partitioned the region in which the response variables (and in some cases
covariates) lie into disjoint cells.54 I calculated the quadratic form based on the diﬀerence
between the observed number of outcomes in each cell and the expected number (given the
observed covariates). If the model is correct, the normalized quadratic form converges in
distribution to a chi-square random variable as the sample size increases.
Formal tests were not able to reject the null that the predicted values for market shares
are the same as the observed values.55 I also constructed test statistics based on the
average value of shares that fall into speciﬁed cells. Again, the test statistic is below the
10% level of signiﬁcance critical value: the null hypotheses is not rejected. Examination
of the cells indicate that the model does a good job of predicting average market shares
across cells. Finally, controlling for product characteristics, the model does a good job
of predicting average market shares across cells. However, the model tends to miss more
among non-Pentium based products.
In addition, I compare the informative model predictions to those from two other baseline
models: one in which there is no role for advertising and one in which advertising takes on
an uninformative role. The ﬁrst model is the BLP model (with micro moments) discussed in
the section above. This model can be viewed as a version of the limited information model
where the information technology is restricted to be one for every product. The second
model is one in which consumers are assumed to know all products for sale, but advertising
aﬀects the utility function directly, this model I refer to as the uninformative model.56
I would prefer to be able to test the relative ﬁt of the models parametrically. Un-
fortunately a formal test of non-nested hypotheses (Vuong, 1989) would require additional
54 These tests are based on those presented in Andrews(1988). The predetermined number of cells are
centered at the mean of the response variable with a width proportional to its standard deviation.
55 The test statistic is distributed chi-squared with 7 degrees of freedom, and the realized value of 4.8 is
below the 10% level of signiﬁcance critical value of 12. While the model ﬁts well, it misses more among
lower market share products.
56 The parameter estimates for the BLP baseline model and the uniniformative advertising model can be
found in Appendix C.
47assumptions on the distribution of the error terms. While the data suggests no natural
assumptions on the error distributions, there are some ways to view the results of the model
to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the ﬁt of the informative model relative to
the other models. For instance, both the informative and uninformative models predict a
threshold level of average group advertising expenditures above which products will be ad-
vertised in groups and below which they will be advertised individually. Therefore we should
never observe expenditures on group advertisements below this level, nor product-speciﬁc
expenditures above the threshold level. The informative and uninformative models predict
diﬀerent threshold levels, and these predictions are presented in the second panel of Table
15. The informative model misses about 4 percent of the time, while the uninformative
model misses twice as much, 8.2%. Most of the misses for both models are among Apple
products (7%, informative and 8% uninformative), while both models’ predictions match the
data for HP and Packard Bell. In addition, both models miss more among television ad-
vertisements (3.8%, informative and 5.5%, uninformative). The fact that the uninformative
model ﬁts worse in this dimension is not surprising, since the uninformative model predicts
a higher threshold level of 1.66 million, so we expect to observe a larger percentage of group
expenditures below the predicted level. However, it is surprising that the informative model
does no worse than the uninformative model regarding the proportion of product-speciﬁc
expenditures above the predicted level. Both models miss less than 1% on average, with all
the misses coming among Apple and Compaq products. This anecdotal evidence suggests
at the very least that the informative model ﬁts no worse than the uninformative model
regarding advertising expenditures.
Another dimension along which the models can be compared regards the role of unob-
served product attributes. Recall the mean utility is a function of observed and unobserved
product attributes. In all models, the mean utility levels are chosen such that predicted
market shares match observed market shares. While there is no explicit role for advertising
in the BLP model, one can interpret the unobserved product heterogeneity terms ( ξj)a s
48containing product advertising. In the model of limited information, a product with little
advertising is unlikely to be in many consumer’s choice sets and will have a low market
share. In the BLP model, a small market share would be explained by a low value for ξj.57
Under the BLP approach advertising is not in the model and is captured only indirectly
through the ξj, whereas with the other models advertising enters explicitly either through
utility or through the information technology. Using the parameter estimates, I restricted
ξj to zero and recalculated the predicted market shares for each of the three models. These
“psuedo”predicted market shares are presented in the ﬁrst panel of Table 15. These give
insight into the importance of unobserved product attributes in each model as well as indi-
cating how well the model ﬁts market shares based solely on observables and the form of the
model. The results for the BLP model are presented in the last column. The BLP model’s
predicted psuedo shares do not come within 10% of the observed market shares for any of the
top ﬁrms. This is not so surprising as the ξ play a larger role in the BLP model relative to the
other models. The informative model ﬁts the market shares better than the uninformative
model, for Gateway and HP the psuedo market shares are within 5% of observed shares, and
for Compaq, IBM, and Packard Bell the psuedo shares are within 10%. The uninformative
model comes within 5% of the observed market shares for Gateway, and within 10% for HP
and Packard Bell. Neither model of advertising predicts the Apple market shares within
10%, this is perhaps not so surprising given that the ﬁrm for which advertising misses the
most is Apple as discussed previously. These results suggest the informative advertising
model of limited information does a good job of predicting advertising and market shares
in the PC industry, relative to models in which consumers are assumed to be aware of all
products.
Modeling advertising as aﬀecting a consumer’s choice set, requires signiﬁcant computation
time since the choice sets for each consumer must be simulated. To test if the beneﬁts of
simulating choice sets where worth the costs of increased computation time, I performed a
57 I thank an anonymous referee for this point.
49monte-carlo experiment with a simpliﬁed version of the model. Consider a market consisting
of two products and one outside good. Denote the probability consumers are aware of a
product by φj. As i m p l i ﬁed version of the market share of product 1 as presented in this
study is given by






where Dj represents exp(δj), the mean utility from product j. The market share is deﬁned










I calculated the values of sj and s∗
j for diﬀerent values of φ and D.T h e m o n t e - c a r l o
experiments indicated that the value of s∗
j was within 5% of the value of sj only 2% of the
time.
Notice also that the speciﬁcation for s∗
j is not separately identiﬁable from a model in which
advertising enters the utility function directly (or a model in which advertising is included
in ξj). This obtains by deﬁning φ
∗ =l n ( φ) and D =e x p ( δ + φ
∗). These results suggests
two things. The more computationally demanding model presented in this study cannot be
replaced by a simpliﬁed version. Secondly, advertising which inﬂuences consumers’ choice
sets has very diﬀerent eﬀects from that which shifts demand directly through utility. That
is the standard BLP model and models in which advertising are one of the observed product
attributes are not observationally equivalent to the model presented in this research.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
In markets characterized by rapid change, such as the PC industry, consumers are unlikely
to be aware of all products for sale when making their purchase decision. In this paper, I
develop and estimate a structural model of demand and supply which incorporates limited
50consumer information. Multi-product ﬁrms may choose to provide information to consumers
about the existence of their product through informative advertising. The empirical model
allows for three important sources of consumer heterogeneity: in tastes, choice sets, and
advertising exposure. However, as is common in many industries, individual level purchase
and advertising exposure data are not available. I show how to use an auxiliary dataset on
media exposure together with aggregate advertising data to incorporate heterogeneity across
consumers with respect to advertising eﬀectiveness.
This study adds to the existing literature in that it (i) provides a structural model
of informative advertising where advertising directly aﬀects the consumers choice set, (ii)
develops a simulator to deal with limited information and the large number of possible choice
sets facing a consumer, (iii) incorporates ﬁrm behavior with regard to prices and advertising
choices across media (allowing for corner solutions in the econometric model), (iv) shows how
to use data on media exposure to incorporate heterogeneity across consumers with regard
to advertising eﬀectiveness, (v) and develops a technique to deal with the existence of group
advertising. The results explain variation in behavior across ﬁr m sw i t hr e g a r dt oa d v e r t i s i n g
expenditures in general and medium choices in particular. I ﬁnd that there are economies of
scope in group advertising and some ﬁrms ﬁnd it worthwhile to engage in group advertising
to capitalize on the increasing returns. Estimated advertising elasticities indicate that, for
some ﬁrms, advertising one product has a negative eﬀect on other products sold by that
ﬁrm, but it is less negative than for most of the rival products.
T h ee c o n o m i ci m p o r t a n c eo ft h i ss t u d ym a yb es u m m a r i z e da sf o l l o w s . T h ee s t i m a t e s
indicate that products are priced in the elastic portion of the demand curve, consistent with
oligopolistic conduct. Median markups in the PC industry are high: 19% over production
costs, with the top ﬁrms earning higher than average markups and engaging in higher than
average advertising. Furthermore, the results suggest ﬁrms are using advertising media
to target high-income households. The high industry markups are explained in part by
the fact that consumers know only some of the products for sale. Indeed estimates from
51traditional consumer choice models predict median markups of one-fourth this magnitude.
These ﬁndings indicate that ignoring the consequences of limited information, and hence
the strategic role of informative advertising, may yield misleading conclusions regarding the
degree of competition in the market. Considering the eﬀects of informative advertising are of
particular importance when conducting policy analysis in industries characterized by rapid
change. Assuming consumers are aware of all products generates estimates of product-
speciﬁc demand curves that are biased towards being too elastic. As a result, antitrust
authorities may reach diﬀerent conclusions regarding the welfare implications of mergers
relative to traditional models of full information58 , if they consider limited information on
the part of consumers.
58 Inconsistent demand side estimates yield inconsistent estimates of proﬁt changes (especially when supply
side information is also limited). Under the assumptions of full information, the eﬀects of consumer welfare
(as measured as the area under the Hicksian or Marshallian demand curves) will thus be understated. See
Goeree (2003) for a start on this topic.
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Manufacturer Percentage Unit Share Percentage Dollar Share
1996 1997 1998 1996 1997 1998
Acer 6.02 5.89 4.42 6.20 6.02 4.37
Apple 7.39 5.00 6.97 6.66 5.79 9.16
Compaq 12.18 18.81 17.53 11.89 16.29 16.43
Dell 2.22 2.42 1.92 2.46 2.87 2.57
Gateway 7.80 11.13 13.36 8.94 11.77 16.43
Hewlett-Packard 4.07 5.37 10.16 4.02 5.52 10.05
IBM 8.06 7.01 7.75 8.49 7.42 6.85
NEC 3.13 3.22
Packard Bell 26.83 23.48
Packard Bell-NEC 23.23 17.78 21.02 16.33
15 included 85.31 83.15 81.08 83.61 82.34 83.88
Total Home Sales 7,736 9,217 11,343 $16,529 $18,610 $17,673
Notes: Others in the "15 included" are AST, ATT(NCR), DEC, Epson, Micron, and Texas Instr.
Total unit sales are in thousands, dollars in millions.  In 1997 three mergers occurred:
Packard Bell, NEC, and ZDS; Acer and Texas Instr.; Gateway and Advanced Logic Research
Table 1: Home Market Shares of Leading Manufacturers
Manufacturer Advertising Total Ad to Sales Ad$ per Market
Expenditures Market Share Ratio Share Point
Apple $181 8.88% 4.90% $20.37
Compaq $240 16.10% 2.56% $14.91
Dell $227 16.02% 2.28% $14.17
Gateway $358 15.07% 5.99% $23.75
Hewlett-Packard $466 9.62% 10.28% $48.44
IBM $1,079 7.30% 19.55% $147.82
Total for PC market $2,068 3.34%
Note: Dollars are in millions. Total market share is dollar market share for all sectors (home,
business, education, and government).
Table 2: 1998 Advertising Expenditures for Selected ManufacturersVariable Description Sample Population
Mean Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev.
male 0.663 0.474 0.661 0.473
white 0.881 0.324 0.881 0.324
age (years) 47.381 15.676 46.866 15.129
midage (=1 if 30<age<50) 0.443 0.497 0.449 0.497
education (years) 13.980 2.543 13.998 2.347
married 0.564 0.496 0.572 0.495
household size 2.633 1.429 2.631 1.428
employed 0.695 0.460 0.693 0.461
income ($) 56745.33 45246.23 56340.40 44464.85
inclow (=1 if income<$60,000) 0.667 0.471 0.669 0.471
inchigh (=1 if income>$100,000) 0.107 0.309 0.106 0.308
own pc (=1 if own a PC) 0.466 0.499 0.470 0.499
pcnew (=1 if PC bought in last 12 months) 0.113 0.317 0.112 0.316
Notes: Unless units are specified variable is a dummy. Number of observations in survey is 39,931. Sample size is 13,400.
Table 3: Selected Consumer Attributes
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
cable (=1 if receive cable) 0.749 0.434 0 1
hours cable (per day) 3.607 2.201 0 7
hours non-cable (per day) 3.003 2.105 0 6.2
hours radio (per day) 2.554 2.244 0 6.5
magazine (=1 if read last quarter) 0.954 0.170 0 1
number magazines (read last quarter) 6.870 6.141 0 95
weekend newspaper (=1 if read last quarter) 0.819 0.318 0 1
weekday newspaper (=1 if read last quarter) 0.574 0.346 0 1
Notes: These summary statistics are based on reports published by Simmons Market Research.
Table 4: Media ExposureDependent Variable: Purchased PC in Last 12 Months
Explanatory Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Constant -1.5549 ** (0.1399) -1.5133 ** (0.1376) -1.4907 ** (0.1383)
age 0.0141 ** (0.0058) 0.0140 ** (0.0058) 0.0132 ** (.0058)
age squared -0.0002 ** (0.0001) -0.0002 ** (0.0001) -0.0002 ** (.00006
edusp (education if <11) -0.0585 ** (0.0075) -0.0588 ** (0.0075) -0.0609 ** (.0074)
eduhs (=1 if highest edu 12 years) -0.3427 ** (0.0503) -0.3441 ** (0.0502) -0.3579 ** (.0500)
eduad (=1 if highest edu 1-3 college) -0.1735 ** (0.0466) -0.1715 ** (0.0465) -0.1838 ** (.0463)
edubs (=1 if highest edu college grad) -0.1028 ** (0.0398) -0.1008 ** (0.0398) -0.1023 ** (.0396)
married (=1 if married) 0.1082 ** (0.0307) 0.1067 ** (0.0306) 0.1036 ** (.0304)
hh size (household size) 0.0660 ** (0.0093) 0.0660 ** (0.0093) 0.063 ** (.0092)
inclow (=1 if income<$60,000) -0.1436 ** (0.0305) -0.1438 ** (0.0303) -0.1586 ** (.0301)
inchigh (=1 if income>$100,000) 0.1067 ** (0.0406) 0.1093 ** (0.0405) 0.1042 ** (.0403)
malewh (=1 if male and white) 0.0834 ** (0.0283) 0.0828 ** (0.0283) 0.0927 ** (.0282)
mag 1 (=1 if magazine quintile=1)  -0.0383 (0.0325) -0.0338 (0.0321)
mag 2 (=1 if magazine quintile=2) 0.0482 (0.0306) 0.0497 * (0.0304)
np 1 (=1 if newspaper quintile=1) 0.0176 (0.0308)
np 2 (=1 if newspaper quintile=2) -0.0059 (0.0334)
tv 1 (=1 if television quintile=1) -0.1264 ** (0.0627) -0.1240 ** (0.0626)
tv 2 (=1 if television quintile=2) -0.0664 ** (0.0314) -0.0657 ** (0.0314)
radio 1 (=1 if radio quintile=1) 0.0856 (0.0549)
radio 2 (=1 if radio quintile=2) 0.0116 (0.0264)
Log Likelihood -6479 -6481 -6536
Likelihood Ratio Test Statistic -4.7 -114.6
Prob>Test Statistic 0.4538 0.0000
Note: These results use the complete Simmons data set; sample size 20,100.  The first specification is the unrestricted model to which I compare the  
other specifications.  ** indicates significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. 
Table 5: Probit Estimates of Purchase ProbabilitiesChoice Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Apple price 0.0005 ** (0.0000) 0.0003 ** (0.0000) 0.0005 ** (0.0000)
total advertising 0.0135 ** (0.0002)
newspaper advertising 0.0951 ** (0.0026)
magazine advertising 0.0148 ** (0.0018)
television advertising -0.0001 (0.0004)
Compaq price 0.0006 ** (0.0000) 0.0004 ** (0.0000) 0.0007 ** (0.0000)
total advertising 0.0134 ** (0.0002)
newspaper advertising 0.0969 ** (0.0026)
magazine advertising 0.0139 ** (0.0018)
television advertising -0.0159 ** (0.0005)
Dell price 0.0007 ** (0.0000) 0.0006 ** (0.0000) 0.0009 ** (0.0000)
total advertising 0.0133 ** (0.0002)
newspaper advertising 0.0963 ** (0.0026)
magazine advertising 0.0141 ** (0.0018)
television advertising -0.0122 ** (0.0007)
Gateway price 0.0009 ** (0.0000) 0.0009 ** (0.0000) 0.0009 ** (0.0000)
total advertising -0.0074 ** (0.0007)
newspaper advertising 0.0564 ** (0.0049)
magazine advertising -0.0153 (0.0183)
television advertising -0.0088 ** (0.0008)
HP price 0.0005 ** (0.0000) 0.0002 ** (0.0000) 0.0005 ** (0.0000)
total advertising 0.0128 ** (0.0002)
newspaper advertising 0.0961 ** (0.0026)
magazine advertising 0.0116 ** (0.0018)
television advertising -0.0029 ** (0.0004)
IBM price 0.0003 ** (0.0000) 0.0000 * (0.0000) 0.0003 ** (0.0000)
total advertising 0.0135 ** (0.0002)
newspaper advertising 0.0963 ** (0.0026)
magazine advertising 0.0146 ** (0.0018)
television advertising 0.0012 ** (0.0004)
Log Likelihood -79,052 -57,408 -54,343
Notes:  ** indicates significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level.  The base group is Texas Instruments and estimation is for all
15 included firms.
Table 6: Preliminary Estimates of Manufacturer ChoiceVariable Means Standard Coefficient estimates for interactions
Deviation
utility coefficients
interactions with demographic variables
household size income > $100,000 30<age<50 white male
cpu speed (MHz) 9.9490 ** 0.1390 ** 3.9209 ** -- -- --
(1.1262) (0.0283) (0.8774)
pentium 0.2499 0.2978 -- 0.0744 -- --
(5.8061) (0.7234) (3.3086)
laptop 3.7080 ** 1.0712 -- -- 1.3537 4.4313





















packard bell 4.0766 **
(1.6603)
advertising coefficients






interactions with total advertising  See table 9 for the 
constant -1.5700 ** acer 0.5824 coefficients on interactions
(0.0872) (118.4350) between advertising and
high school graduate 0.5504 ** apple 0.3644 * demographic variables
(0.0187) (0.2066)
income < $60,000 0.4818 ** compaq 0.6244 **
(0.1048) (0.1607)
income > $100,000 0.4512 dell 0.5827 *
(0.3926) (0.3533)
gateway 0.9046 **
np and mag advertising 1.0317 (0.1385)
(2.1168) hp 0.8049
tv advertising 1.0626 ** (23.7230)
(0.1418) ibm 0.6215 **
(0.1383)
(np and mag advertising)
2 -0.0212 * micron 0.7384
(0.0110) (3.7633)
(tv advertising)
2 -0.0346 ** packard bell 0.6550 **
(0.0169) (0.0861)
Notes: ** indicates significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Table 7: Structural Estimates (for Home Sector)
57Apple Apple Compaq Compaq Dell HP HP IBM IBM
Power Mac PowerBook* Presario* Presario Dimension Pavilion Omnibook* Aptiva Thinkpad*
Power Mac -11.2544 0.0749 0.0151 0.0178 0.0180 0.0182 0.0206 0.0146 0.0234
PowerBook* 0.0987 -12.7893 0.0122 0.0144 0.0162 0.0147 0.0173 0.0117 0.0188
Presario* 0.0136 0.0168 -6.0864 0.0315 0.0266 0.0318 0.0369 0.0255 0.0409
Presario 0.0251 0.0301 0.0495 -7.1969 0.0347 0.0298 0.0346 0.0239 0.0334
Dimension 0.0135 0.0169 0.0268 0.0319 -8.0341 0.0322 0.0280 0.0259 0.0311
Pavilion 0.0268 0.0330 0.0261 0.0311 0.0349 -5.5801 0.0361 0.0252 0.0241
Omnibook* 0.0166 0.0203 0.0328 0.0194 0.0219 0.0197 -5.6129 0.0158 0.0505
Aptiva 0.0239 0.0296 0.0307 0.0367 0.0309 0.0278 0.0323 -5.8874 0.0359
Thinkpad* 0.0098 0.0122 0.0198 0.0231 0.0257 0.0239 0.0338 0.0187 -9.0513
Notes: Cell entries i,j where i,indexes row and j column, give the percentage change in market share of brand I, with a one percentage change in the
price of j. Each entry represents the average of the elasticities from 1998. A * indicates a laptop.
Table 8: A Sample from 1998 of Estimated Price Elasticities
Media
Magazine Newspaper Television Radio
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
constant -1.1543 ** (0.0385) -1.0420 ** (0.0378) -0.8799 ** (0.0392) -1.7820 ** (0.0412)
midage -0.0425 * (0.0234) 0.1988 ** (0.0242) 0.0173 (0.0236) -0.0301 (0.0241)
mature (age>50) 0.0033 (0.0239) 0.5284 ** (0.0243) 0.1894 ** (0.0238) -0.2484 ** (0.0242)
married -0.0239 (0.0182) 0.1869 ** (0.0184) 0.0729 ** (0.0182) -0.0107 (0.0187)
hh size 0.0391 ** (0.0057) -0.0348 ** (0.0060) 0.0173 ** (0.0058) 0.0119 * (0.0061)
inclow -0.1958 ** (0.0195) -0.2520 ** (0.0197) 0.1118 ** (0.0201) -0.1197 ** (0.0205)
inchigh 0.1565 ** (0.0294) 0.1355 ** (0.0283) -0.0196 (0.0305) 0.0736 ** (0.0304)
malewh -0.0791 ** (0.0170) 0.0066 (0.0171) -0.0193 (0.0169) 0.0072 (0.0173)
eduhs -0.1219 ** (0.0254) -0.3354 ** (0.0251) 0.2682 ** (0.0256) 0.0839 ** (0.0260)
eduad 0.0185 (0.0265) -0.1538 ** (0.0261) 0.2541 ** (0.0269) 0.1313 ** (0.0273)
edubs -0.0276 (0.0260) -0.0504 ** (0.0253) 0.1317 ** (0.0265) 0.1020 ** (0.0269)
edusp -0.0302 ** (0.0034) -0.0660 ** (0.0035) 0.0315 ** (0.0033) -0.0134 ** (0.0034)
Log Likelihood -31983 -31087 -31052 -28597
Notes: Estimates include time dummies.   ** indicates significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
 
Table 9: Likelihood Estimates of Media ExposureApple Apple Compaq Compaq Dell Dell HP IBM
Macintosh PowerBook* Presario* Presario Dimension Latitude* Omnibook* Thinkpad*
Macintosh 0.0212 -0.0102 -0.0216 -0.0202 -0.0206 -0.0262 -0.0206 -0.0141
PowerBook* -0.0097 0.0076 -0.0092 -0.0093 -0.0098 -0.0098 -0.0094 -0.0069
Presario* -0.1011 -0.0867 0.0935 -0.0944 -0.0925 -0.0938 -0.0954 -0.0571
Presario -0.1050 -0.1002 -0.0130 0.1025 -0.1006 -0.1028 -0.1028 -0.0790
Dimension -0.0297 -0.0368 -0.0382 -0.0334 0.0330 -0.0304 -0.0338 -0.0214
Latitude* -0.0081 -0.0096 -0.0093 -0.0106 -0.0094 0.0095 -0.0091 -0.0074
OmniBook* -0.0046 -0.0037 -0.0045 -0.0043 -0.0049 -0.0041 0.0047 -0.0038
Thinkpad* -0.0157 -0.0153 -0.0129 -0.0183 -0.0151 -0.0153 -0.0083 0.0108
Notes: Cell entries i,j where i,indexes row and j column, give the percentage change in market share of i.
with a $1000 increase in the advertising of j.  * indicates the PC is a laptop.
Table 10: A Sample from 1997 of Estimated Advertising Semi-Elasticities
Variable Coefficient Standard
Error
ln marginal cost of production
constant 10.0230 ** (0.1784)
ln(cpu speed) 0.4932 ** (0.0062)
pentium dummy -0.3978 ** (0.0926)
laptop dummy 1.3054 ** (0.2691)
quarterly trend -0.1320 ** (0.0214)
ln marginal cost of advertising
constant 7.0356 ** (1.9230)
ln(price of advertising) 1.0004 ** (0.0002)
non-home sector marginal revenue
constant 2.4053 * (1.2869)
non-home sector price 1.0350 ** (0.0749)
cpu speed 0.0198 ** (0.0028)
non-pc sales 5.2707 * (2.8202)
Notes: ** indicates significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
Table 11: Structural Cost and Non-Home Sector EstimatesMedian Percentage Markup
Median Price Ad to Sales Ratio over Marginal Costs including ad costs
Total Industry $2,239 3.34% 19% 10%
Top 6 firm $2,172 8.66% 22% 12%
Apple $1,859 4.90% 19% 10%
Compaq $2,070 2.56% 24% 16%
Gateway $2,767 5.99% 12% 9%
Hewlett Packard $2,203 10.28% 17% 11%
IBM $2,565 19.55% 17% 10%
Packard Bell $2,075 19.55% 18% 12%
Note: Ad to sales ratios are from LNA and include ad and sales across all sectors.  Percentage markups are the median
(price-marginal costs)/price across all products. The last column is percentage total markups per unit after including 
advertising.  These are determined from estimated markups and estimated effective product advertising in the home sector.
Table 12: Summary Statistics for Prices, Advertising, and MarkupsMedian Percentage Markup
Under Partial  Under Full Change
Information Information in Markups
Total industry 19% 5% -73%
Apple 2.5% -86%
iMac 22.2% 3.1%
Power Mac 13.7% 2.0%







Gateway Desk Series 12.9% 1.9%








IBM PC 23.2% 2.3%
Packard Bell 3.0% -83%
NEC Versa* 11.1% 1.6%
NEC Desk Series 17.7% 2.5%
Notes: Percentage markups are defined as (price-marginal cost)/price.  Full information is the traditional model in which
consumers know all products; under partial information the choice set is estimated. * indicates that computers are laptops.
Table 13: Estimated Percentage Markups
61Apple Compaq Gateway HP IBM Packard Bell
under partial information
Apple -10.1720 0.0576 0.0199 0.0249 0.0178 0.0241
Compaq 0.0404 -6.6810 0.0416 0.0516 0.0370 0.0499
Gateway 0.0396 0.1184 -10.1177 0.0511 0.0366 0.0494
Hewlett-Packard 0.0434 0.1288 0.0447 -6.2509 0.0399 0.0538
IBM 0.0296 0.0870 0.0304 0.0377 -7.5830 0.0364
Packard Bell 0.0312 0.2808 0.0543 0.0676 0.0484 -7.4831
under full information (blp benchmark)
Apple -29.2337 0.1901 0.0448 0.1036 0.0726 0.0735
Compaq 0.0188 -34.1364 0.0237 0.0548 0.0384 0.0389
Gateway 0.0378 0.2024 -34.6917 0.1103 0.0773 0.0782
Hewlett-Packard 0.0032 0.0171 0.0040 -37.9312 0.0066 0.0067
IBM 0.1014 0.5431 0.1277 0.2963 -32.5824 0.2102
Packard Bell 0.0707 0.3793 0.0895 0.2066 0.1446 -35.8697
Notes: Cell entries i,j where i,indexes row and j column, give the percentage change in market share of brand I, with a one percentage change
in the price of j.  Each entry represents median elasticities over all products for 1998.
Table 14: Estimated Firm Price Elasticities (1998)
62Prediction for different models of advertising
Response Variable Observed Informative Uninformative No role
average annual percent market shares 
Apple 6.45% 8.68% 8.96% 5.15%
Compaq 16.17% 17.48% * 17.98% 19.74%
Gateway 10.76% 11.32% ** 10.99% ** 13.07%
HP 6.53% 6.31% ** 5.99% * 1.98%
IBM 7.60% 8.40% * 8.59% 9.38%
Packard Bell 22.61% 20.60% * 24.34% * 27.41%
group and product-specific advertising 
Predicted threshold value (in millions) 1.41 1.66 not applicable
percent group expenditures below predicted threshold value











percent product-specific expenditures above predicted threshold value











Notes: Predicted market shares are evaluated at parameter estimates with unobserved product attributes restricted to zero.
** indicates that predicted values within 5% of the observed value * within 10% of the true value
level. Predicted group advertising expenditures threshold value is in millions.  Advertising expenditures are computed using equation (1)
evalulated at the optimal parameter values.   Firm percentages are calculated as percent of product/medium advertising by that firm.
Table 15: Goodness of Fit Comparisons
63Appendices
A Restricting Nonlinear Parameter Search





can be restricted to a search over the parameters Ω = {θ, ηAD} because β, η are uniquely
determined by the choice of θ. This can be seen by rewriting the ﬁrst-order conditions that






















































which are determined by the choice of θ,w h e r eZ∗A∗−1Z∗0 are the portions of the instrument
and weighting matrices corresponding to the moments arising from the demand and pricing
ﬁrst-order conditions.
B Simulation Details
A general outline for simulation follows, I omit the time subscript for clarity. First prepare
random draws, which, once drawn, do not change throughout estimation.
1. In the case of the macro moments,
(a) Draw i =1 ,...,ns consumers from the joint distribution of characteristics and
income given by the CPS, F(D,y), and corresponding draws from multivariate
normal distribution of unobservable consumer characteristics, F(ν), one for each
product characteristic, call these νik (where I drew a sample of 3000 for each year,
ns = 9000)
(b) Draw log normal variables one for each medium combination, call these κim.(where
m =4 )(c) Draw uniform random variables one for each product-individual pair, call these
uij.
2. For the micro moments
(a) For each Simmons consumer i =1 ,...,ncons draw R times from multivariate
normal distribution of unobservable consumer characteristics, F(ν), one for each
product characteristic, call these νikr.( w h e r encons = 13400)
(b) Draw R uniform random variables for each product-individual combination, call
these uijr.
(c) Draw R log normal variables one for each medium-individual combination, call
these κimr.
3. Choose an initial value of the parameters θ0
4. For the macro-moments, do for i =1 ,...,ns
(a) Calculate φij(θ) for each product j =1 ,...,J for each period
φij(θ)=
exp(τij)




























(b) Given φij(θ) and uij construct a J dimensional Bernoulli vector, bi(θ). This deﬁnes





1 if φij(θ) >u ij
0 if φij (θ) ≤ uij
Deﬁne b0







i,k=1 exp{δk + µik}




d ΠkdDid) given the ith draw
and θ.(d) Calculate







i(θ0) is the value of Πl∈S0φilΠk/ ∈S0 (1 − φik) using the initial value of the
parameters and the initial choice set. During estimation the parameter values
will be updated so the simulated product over the φij will diﬀer from the initial
φ
0
i(θ0) in all but the ﬁrst simulation.





































1+e x p( τijr)






(b) Given φijr(θ) and uijr construct a J dimensional Bernoulli vector, bir(θ). This






1 if φijr(θ) >u ijr
0 if φijr (θ) ≤ uijr
Deﬁne b0







ir,k=1 exp{δk + µikr}





id) given the rth
draw and θ.
66(d) Calculate







ir(θ0) is the value of Πl∈SrφilΠk/ ∈Sr (1 − φik) using the initial choice set
evaluated at the initial value of the parameters, b0
ir.












C Full Information Parameter Estimates
Interactions with demographic variables
Variable Standard household income >   30<age<50 white





cpu speed (MHz) 12.1745 ** 0.2878 ** 0.6967 ** -- -- --
(2.2525) (0.0566) (0.2925)
pentium 2.2631 0.7168 ** -- 0.7495 * -- --
(2.9031) (0.3617) (0.3893)
laptop 3.0241 * 0.3158 ** -- -- -0.2052 0.3913 *

















packard bell 6.6300 *
(3.3207)
Notes: ** indicates significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Appendix C Table 1: BLP Model Demand EstimatesInteractions with demographic variables
Variable Standard household income < income >   30<age<50 high school  white





cpu speed (MHz) 18.5052 ** 0.5352 ** 0.9336 ** -- -- -- -- --
(4.5050) (0.2262) (0.4387)
pentium 4.3071 0.0649 ** -- -- -1.9431 -- -- --
(8.7092) (0.0289) (1.6543)
laptop -1.8485 * 0.1562 ** -- -- -- -2.8122 -- 1.5265







television 2.6127 * 0.0880 0.0382 0.0152 ** 0.0021 -0.0177 * 0.0290 -0.0724
(1.5094) (0.0792) (0.1580) (0.0074) (0.0055) (0.0094) (0.1509) (0.0439)
magazine and newspaper 0.6122 * -0.6658 * -0.1630 ** -0.0248 0.7535 0.2328 -0.8555


















packard bell -2.8169 *
(1.5094)
advertising coefficients





Notes: ** indicates significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Appendix C Table 2: Uninformative Model Demand Estimates
68Variable BLP model Uninformative Model
Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
Error Error
ln marginal cost of production
constant 12.6836 ** (0.3503) 7.5037 ** (0.7005)
ln(cpu speed) 1.2788 * (0.6788) 0.2486 ** (0.0185)
pentium -0.8888 ** (0.1854) -0.4403 ** (0.2039)
laptop 0.5078 ** (0.1347) 1.1417 ** (0.5387)
quarterly trend -0.1009 ** (0.0432) -0.1874 ** (0.0886)
ln marginal cost of advertising
constant 4.6904 ** (2.3076)
price of advertising 1.0000 ** (0.0197)
non-home sector marginal revenue
constant 1.2943 (1.1699)
non-home sector price 1.0252 ** (0.1648)
cpu speed 0.0169 ** (0.0083)
non-pc sales 5.1320 * (2.6860)
Notes: ** indicates significant at the 5% level; * significant at the 10% level.
Appendix C Table 3: Supply Side Estimates
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